Barolomeo Scala, de Consolatione 22:
From where do you think that so many and such great errors, both in philosophy and in religion, sprang forth from almost the beginning of the world? Certainly Greece itself, which was always most famous because of the talents of its people and their cleverness in invention and decoration, had such a diversity of schools that it finally arrived to the number of two hundred and eighty eight sects, as Augustine says in his The City of God. They stirred up a kind of contest and confusion of knowledge, so that whether it was a question of the highest good, or of virtues (if I may omit the greater delusions of religion), there was nothing of the questions about some type of honors which did not find its defenders and champions. For, in questions of pain or suffering – for so they wish a harsh movement of the mind from the thought of some evil to be called instead of pain – even if they rightly brought forth the similarity of mental and bodily illnesses, nevertheless, whether it was to be called pain or suffering, they offer us nothing except for contention and a kind of gladiatorial game with their endless disputations. Meanwhile, they defend and embrace some kind of ineffable wisdom which looks down at everything as if from some high promontory, and as though human affairs had nothing to do with it, condemns and despises them. With their gracious leave, I don’t see how they can be called wise.
Unde enim putas tot tantosque errores, et in philosophia et in religione, iam tum a principio fere conditi orbis aliunde pululasse? Graecia ipsa profecto, quae semper ob suorum hominum preclara ingenia et ad inveniendum exornandumque sollertiam fabulosissima fuit, hinc tantam habuit disciplinarum diversitatem ut ad sectarum numerum ducentarum et octuaginta octo, ut Augustinus auctor est in libris De Civitate Dei pervenisseiam potuerit; et scientiarum quasi certamen quoddam et confusionem excitant, ut sive de summo bono, sive de virtutibus quaeratur, ut maiora illa de religione deliramenta praetermittam, nihil fere ex his quae sunt de genere aliquo honorum defensores atque assertores proprios non invenerit. Nam de dolore quidem aut aegritudine— ita enim asperum animi motum praesentis alicuius mali opinione appellari malunt quam dolore— etsi similitudinem animi morborum et corporis, et vero quidem, inducant, tamen, sive dolor ille sit sive aegritudo nuncupanda, nihil nobis afferunt praeter contentionem et quasi digladiationem quandam perpetuis eorum disputationibus, dum sapientiam nescio quam defendunt atque complectuntur, quae tanquam ex altissima specula despiciat et, quasi ad se nihil humana pertineant, ambitiose contemnat ac pro nihilo habeat. Quod bona eorum venia dictum sit, non video quo modo ipsi quidem sint existimandi sapientes.