Tag: Moralia

Replacing Your Brother is Like Cutting off a Limb

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Plutarch, On Brotherly Love 479 B-D

 

“The Arcadian prophet*, according to Herodototus, was compelled to have a wooden foot made after he lost his own. But when a brother makes an enemy of his brother and then obtains a surrogate companion from the marketplace or the gym he isn’t doing anything other than cutting off a natural part of his body willingly and then fashioning and applying some alien prosthetic. For a need to seek and welcome friendship and companionship instructs us to honor, cultivate and guard our family because we are not able or created to live friendless, solitary or self-sufficient lives. This is why Menander says rightly (fr.554)

We don’t seek from drinking or daily dining
Someone we trust with our life, father.
Doesn’t each man think he has discovered
An exceptional good when he has only a shadow of a friend?

For most friendships are really shadows—imitations and dreams of that first closeness which nature fosters in children towards parents and towards siblings.   How can a man who does not revere or honor this relationship give any goodwill to others?”

Dioscuri
Castor and Pollux Could Depend on Each Other…

ὁ μὲν οὖν ᾿Αρκαδικὸς μάντις ἀναγκαίως πόδα ξύλινον προσεποιήσατο καθ’ ῾Ηρόδοτον (IX 37) τοῦ οἰκείου στερηθείς· ἀδελφὸς δὲ πολεμῶν ἀδελφῷ καὶ κτώμενος ὀθνεῖον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἢ παλαίστρας ἑταῖρον οὐθὲν ἔοικεν ἄλλο ποιεῖν ἢ σάρκινον καὶ συμφυὲς ἑκουσίως ἀποκόψας μέλος ἀλλότριον προστίθεσθαι καὶ προσαρμόττειν. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ προσδεχομένη καὶ ζητοῦσα φιλίαν καὶ ὁμιλίαν χρεία διδάσκει τὸ συγγενὲς τιμᾶν καὶ περιέπειν καὶ διαφυλάττειν, ὡς ἀφίλους καὶ ἀμίκτους καὶ μονοτρόπους ζῆν μὴ δυναμένους μηδὲ πεφυκότας. ὅθεν ὁ Μένανδρος ὀρθῶς (fr. 554)

 

‘οὐκ ἐκ πότων καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἡμέραν τρυφῆς
ζητοῦμεν ᾧ πιστεύσομεν τὰ τοῦ βίου’ φησί,
‘πάτερ. οὐ περιττὸν οἴετ’ ἐξευρηκέναι
ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστος, ἂν ἔχῃ φίλου σκιάν;’

 

σκιαὶ γάρ εἰσιν ὄντως αἱ πολλαὶ φιλίαι καὶ μιμήματα καὶ εἴδωλα τῆς πρώτης ἐκείνης, ἣν παισί τε πρὸς γονεῖς ἡ φύσις ἀδελφοῖς τε πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς ἐμπεποίηκε, κἀκείνην ὁ μὴ σεβόμενος μηδὲ τιμῶν ὅρα τίνα πίστιν εὐνοίας τοῖς  ἀλλοτρίοις δίδωσιν;

 

 

 

*Hegesitratos from Elis, see Herodotus 9.37.

How is A Gossip Like A Scholar?

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Plutarch, De Curiositate [On Being a Busybody] 519c-d

 

“It turns out that being talkative follows from learning much—this is why Pythagoras assigned a five-year silence to young men which he labeled a “Speech-Truce”—and by necessity slander accompanies excessive curiosity. For, whatever people hear with pleasure, they are pleased to repeat; and whatever they collect eagerly from others, they carry off to even more with joy. As a result, along with the other evils, this disease is also an obstacle to its desire. For everyone guards against the busybody and hides things from him; people don’t want to do anything while the busybody is looking or say anything while he listens; instead, they put off their plans and postpone looking at their affairs until this kind of a person has left.”

Gossip

Τῇ μὲν οὖν πολυμαθείᾳ τὴν πολυλογίαν ἕπεσθαι συμβαίνει (διὸ καὶ Πυθαγόρας ἔταξε τοῖς νέοις πενταετῆ σιωπήν, ἐχεμυθίαν προσαγορεύσας), τῇ δὲ περιεργίᾳ τὴν κακολογίαν ἀνάγκη συνακολουθεῖν· ἃ γὰρ ἡδέως ἀκούουσιν ἡδέως λαλοῦσι, καὶ ἃ παρ’ ἄλλων σπουδῇ συλλέγουσι πρὸς ἑτέρους μετὰ χαρᾶς ἐκφέρουσιν. ὅθεν αὐτοῖς μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τὸ νόσημα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐμποδών ἐστι. πάντες γὰρ αὐτοὺς φυλάττονται καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, καὶ οὔτε πρᾶξαί τι πολυπράγμονος ὁρῶντος οὔτ’ εἰπεῖν ἀκούοντος ἡδέως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ βουλὰς ἀνατίθενται καὶ σκέψεις πραγμάτων ὑπερβάλλονται, μέχρις ἂν ἐκποδὼν ὁ τοιοῦτος γένηται·

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Are you Moved by Fear of Death or Love of Life?

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Plutarch De Tranquilitate Animi, 476b-c

 

“Fear of death rather than desire to live makes the foolish man depend on his body, grasping at it the way Odysseus did the fig-branch when he feared the looming Charybdis “where the wind allowed him neither to remain nor leave” (Aesch. Fr. 250), making him unhappy at this and frightened of that. But someone who has some kind of understanding of the nature of the soul and considers its change at death into something better or at least not worse has no small encouragement in life—being completely fearless of death.

For the one who can live well during the pleasant and familiar part of life, but can also move on without fear when events turn alien or become unnatural, and can say “the god himself will free me when I am ready” (Bacch. 498)—well what might we imagine could happen to make him troubled, angry or upset? For the man who says “I have expected you, Fortune, and I have deprived you of every angle of attack” (Metrodorus, fr. 49) has strengthened himself not with bolts, locks and walls, but with beliefs and reason which everyone who wants to can share.”

Τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀνόητον ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος οὐχ ὁ τοῦ ζῆν πόθος ἐκκρέμασθαι τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖ, περιπεπλεγμένον ὥσπερ τὸν ᾿Οδυσσέα τῷ ἐρινεῷ (μ 432), δεδοικότα τὴν Χάρυβδιν ὑποκειμένην,    ‘ἔνθ’ οὔτε μίμνειν ἄνεμος οὔτε πλεῖν ἐᾷ’ (Aisch. fr. 250), καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα δυσαρέστως καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα περιδεῶς ἔχοντα. ὁ δὲ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἁμωσγέπως ὑπονοῶν καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ βέλτιον αὐτῆς ἢ μηθὲν κάκιον ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ μεταβολὴν ἐπιλογιζόμενος οὐ μικρὸν ἔχει τῆς πρὸς τὸν βίον εὐθυμίας ἐφόδιον τὴν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἀφοβίαν. ᾧ γὰρ ἔξεστι τῆς μὲν ἀρεστῆς καὶ οἰκείας μερίδος ἐπικρατούσης ἡδέως ζῆν, τῶν δ’ ἀλλοτρίων καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπερβαλλόντων ἀδεῶς ἀπελθεῖν εἰπόντα (Eur. Bacch. 498)  ‘λύσει μ’ ὁ δαίμων αὐτός, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω,’ τί ἂν τούτῳ χαλεπὸν ἢ δύσκολον ἢ ταραχῶδες ἐμπίπτον ἐπινοήσαιμεν; ὁ γὰρ εἰπών ‘προκατείλημμαί σ’, ὦ τύχη, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν σὴν ἀφῄρημαι παρείσδυσιν’ (Metrodorus Ep. fr. 49) οὐ μοχλοῖς οὐδὲ κλεισὶν οὐδὲ τείχεσιν ἐθάρρυνεν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ δόγμασι καὶ λόγοις ὧν πᾶσι μέτεστι τοῖς βουλομένοις

Why Does Odysseus Cry over His Dog but Not His Wife?

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Plutarch, De Tranquilitate 475a

 

“The poet illustrates well how powerful the unexpected can be. For Odysseus wept when his dog was fawning on him, but he showed no emotion at all when he sat next to his weeping wife. In the second scene, he arrived with his emotions in hand and managed by reason, but in the earlier he encountered something surprising, all of a sudden, without expecting it.”

 

εὖ δὲ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οἷόν ἐστι τὸ παρὰ προσδοκίαν ἐδίδαξεν· ὁ γὰρ ᾿Οδυσσεὺς τοῦ μὲν κυνὸς σαίνοντος ἐξεδάκρυσε (ρ 302. 304), τῇ δὲ γυναικὶ κλαιούσῃ παρακαθήμενος οὐδὲν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτον (τ 211)· ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ἀφῖκτο τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος ὑποχείριον ἔχων καὶ προκατειλημμένον, εἰς δ’ ἐκεῖνον μὴ προσδοκήσας ἀλλ’ ἐξαίφνης *** διὰ τὸ παράδοξον ἐνέπεσε.

 

Here’s the  moment in question:
Hom. Odyssey 17.300-305

“There lay the dog, Argos, covered with pests.
But then, where he recognized that Odysseus was coming near,
He wagged his tail and flattened both ears,
But he could no longer rise to meet his master.
Then Odysseus looked sideways and wiped away a tear,
Easily escaping Eumaios’ notice; then he questioned him.”

ἔνθα κύων κεῖτ’ ῎Αργος ἐνίπλειος κυνοραιστέων.
δὴ τότε γ’, ὡς ἐνόησεν ᾿Οδυσσέα ἐγγὺς ἐόντα,
οὐρῇ μέν ῥ’ ὅ γ’ ἔσηνε καὶ οὔατα κάββαλεν ἄμφω,
ἄσσον δ’ οὐκέτ’ ἔπειτα δυνήσατο οἷο ἄνακτος
ἐλθέμεν· αὐτὰρ ὁ νόσφιν ἰδὼν ἀπομόρξατο δάκρυ,
ῥεῖα λαθὼν Εὔμαιον, ἄφαρ δ’ ἐρεείνετο μύθῳ·

Go here for the full scene (the tale of Argos’ youth and his sudden death…)

Of Course Plutarch Wrote an Essay on Praising Yourself Inoffensively (Moralia)

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Plutarch, On Praising Yourself Without Inciting Envy 544a-b

“Considered and charming is the man who explains some mistake he made either through ignorance or ambition or an error made in a a subject to be learned or some incapacity in speech as when Odysseus says (12.192-194): “But my heart wanted to listen, and I ordered my companions to unbind me by nodding my brows”. Or again, in another passage (9.228-229): “I did not assent to them, and it would have been far better, but I wanted to see the man and whether he would give me a gift of hospitality.”

Thus, when mistakes which are not completely ignoble or shameful are juxtaposed with praise, they undermine envy. Many also take the edge off possible envy by adding into their praise poverty, loss or even low-birth.”

ἐμμελὴς δὲ καὶ χαρίεις ὁ λήθην τινὰ καθ’ αὑτοῦ λέγων ἢ ἄγνοιαν ἢ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ πρός τινα μαθήματα καὶ λόγους ἀκρασίαν ὡς ὁ ᾿Οδυσσεύς (μ 192)

‘….αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ
ἤθελ’ ἀκουέμεναι, λῦσαι δ’ ἐκέλευον ἑταίρους
ὀφρύσι νευστάζων,’

καὶ πάλιν (ι 228)

‘ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ οὐ πιθόμην—ἦ τ’ ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν—,
ὄφρ’ αὐτόν τε ἴδοιμι, καὶ εἴ μοι ξείνια δοίη.’

καὶ ὅλως ὅσαι μὴ παντάπασιν αἰσχραὶ μηδ’ ἀγεννεῖς ἁμαρτίαι, παρατιθέμεναι τοῖς ἐπαίνοις τὸν φθόνον ἀφαιροῦσι. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἀπορίας καὶ νὴ Δία δυσγενείας ἐξομολόγησιν ἔστιν ὅτε τοῖς ἐγκωμίοις παρεμβάλλοντες ἀμβλυτέρῳ τῷ φθόνῳ χρῶνται.

Not Learning How to Read Poetry Can Corrupt You

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In his “How a Young Man Ought to Listen to Poetry” (Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat; Moralia 14d-37b), Plutarch seems to take on earlier (read: Platonic) injunctions about the dangers posed by imitation.  Here, Plutarch suggests that it is equally perilous not to learn how to read properly:

“A young man should not be in the habit of praising any of these things [e.g. poetry that presents sacrilegious comments about the gods or instances of immortal behavior] nor should he practice offering excuses or be persuasive and persistent in devising certain conspicuous prevarications for improper actions. Instead, let him believe that poetry is the imitation of characters and lives of men who are not perfect nor holy not unimpeachable in all ways—in short of men who are afflicted by suffering, false beliefs and ignorance, but who, thanks to their innate nobility, may often change themselves for the better. This sort of training and perspective for a youth, one which makes him attuned to and excited at things done or said as well as resistant, even intolerant, of base deeds, will not visit harm upon audiences.

But a man who is amazed at everything, one who adapts himself to everything, because of some popular judgment is enchanted by the names of heroes, just like those men who imitate Plato’s bad posture or Aristotle’s lisp. Such a man is predisposed to much that is corrupting without knowing it.”

μηδὲν οὖν ἐπαινεῖν ἐθιζέσθω τοιοῦτον ὁ νέος, μηδὲ προφάσεις λέγων μηδὲ παραγωγάς τινας εὐπρεπεῖς ἐπὶ πράγμασι φαύλοις μηχανώμενος πιθανὸς ἔστω καὶ πανοῦργος, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον οἰέσθω, μίμησιν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν ἠθῶν καὶ βίων, καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὐ τελείων οὐδὲ καθαρῶν οὐδ’ ἀνεπιλήπτων παντάπασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένων πάθεσι καὶ δόξαις ψευδέσι καὶ ἀγνοίαις, διὰ δ’ εὐφυΐαν αὑτοὺς πολλάκις μετατιθέντων πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον. ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη παρασκευὴ τοῦ νέου καὶ διάνοια, τοῖς μὲν εὖ λεγομένοις καὶ πραττομένοις ἐπαιρομένου καὶ συνενθουσιῶντος, τὰ δὲ φαῦλα μὴ προσιεμένου καὶ δυσχεραίνοντος, ἀβλαβῆ παρέξει τὴν ἀκρόασιν. ὁ δὲ πάντα θαυμάζων καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξοικειούμενος καὶ καταδεδουλωμένος τῇ δόξῃ τὴν κρίσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡρωϊκῶν ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ οἱ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀπομιμούμενοι κυρτότητα καὶ τὴν ᾿Αριστοτέλους τραυλότητα, λήσεται πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν φαύλων εὐχερὴς γενόμενος.

If Politicians Ever Agreed, They Might Actually Do Some Harm (Plutarch, Moralia)

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Plutarch, Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat 20 C

“Philosophers, at least, when they want to correct behavior and teach, use examples from real events. But poets do the same thing by making up facts and telling myths! Melanthios, thus, either joking or in earnest, used to say that the city of Athens was saved by the strife and disruption of its politicians, since they would not all gather on one side of the ship. In this way, thanks to the disagreement of the politicians, there was always a counterweight to actual harm. Similarly, the contradictions of the poets do not allow a forceful tipping into harm by bringing restoring our credulity to balance.”

οἱ γοῦν φιλόσοφοι παραδείγμασι χρῶνται, νουθετοῦντες καὶ παιδεύοντες ἐξ ὑποκειμένων· οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ ταὐτὰ ποιοῦσι πλάττοντες αὐτοὶ πράγματα καὶ μυθολογοῦντες. ὁ μὲν οὖν Μελάνθιος εἴτε παίζων εἴτε σπουδάζων ἔλεγε διασῴζεσθαι τὴν ᾿Αθηναίων πόλιν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων διχοστασίας καὶ ταραχῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀποκλίνειν ἅπαντας εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖχον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαί τινα τοῦ  βλάπτοντος ἀνθολκὴν ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν πολιτευομένων. αἱ δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν ὑπεναντιώσεις πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἀνταναφέρουσαι τὴν πίστιν οὐκ ἐῶσιν ἰσχυρὰν ῥοπὴν γενέσθαι πρὸς τὸ βλάπτον.

Before You Read a Poem, Know that Poets Are Liars (Plutarch)

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From Plutarch’s Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat (16a-c)

“First of all, it is best to introduce the youth to poems when they have already learned as a watchword the saying that “poets tell many lies,” some willingly, and others unwillingly. They lie willingly with an eye toward pleasure and attractiveness—things which most people pursue: they feel that the truth is rather more severe than fiction. This is because that truth occurs in reality and does not change even if it ends in displeasure. Fiction, since it is formed by speech, easily changes its direction and turns to pleasure from something that might cause pain.

Hence, neither meter, nor style, nor magnitude of speech, nor fit of metaphor, nor unity and composition have as much seduction and charm as the well-woven plot of a fantastic tale. So, just as in painting color is more moving than a line drawing because it is more life-like and illusory, so too will fiction mixed in with persuasive poetry be more striking and cause more pleasure than a poem well-built in its meter and diction but devoid of myth and fantasy.

This is why Socrates, when he was inspired by some dreams to poetry—since he had been a champion for truth his entire life—was not a believable or natural creator of fiction and instead worked the tales of Aesop in to epic verse because he believed that it was not possible for poetry to exist apart from some fiction.”

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὰ ποιήματα δεῖ τὸν νέον μηδὲν οὕτω μεμελετημένον ἔχοντα καὶ πρόχειρον ὡς τὸ “πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοὶ” τὰ μὲν ἑκόντες τὰ δ’ ἄκοντες. ἑκόντες μέν, ὅτι πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκοῆς καὶ χάριν, ἣν οἱ πλεῖστοι διώκουσιν, αὐστηροτέραν ἡγοῦνται τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ ψεύδους. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔργῳ γιγνομένη, κἂν ἀτερπὲς ἔχῃ τὸ τέλος, οὐκ ἐξίσταται· τὸ δὲ πλαττόμενον λόγῳ ῥᾷστα περιχωρεῖ καὶ τρέπεται πρὸς τὸ ἥδιον ἐκτοῦ λυποῦντος. οὔτε γὰρ μέτρον οὔτε τρόπος οὔτε λέξεως ὄγκος οὔτ’ εὐκαιρία μεταφορᾶς οὔθ’ ἁρμονία καὶ σύνθεσις ἔχει τοσοῦτον αἱμυλίας καὶ χάριτος ὅσον εὖ πεπλεγμένη διάθεσις μυθολογίας· ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐν γραφαῖς κινητικώτερόν ἐστι χρῶμα γραμμῆς διὰ τὸ ἀνδρείκελον καὶ ἀπατηλόν, οὕτως ἐν ποιήμασι μεμιγμένον πιθανότητι ψεῦδος ἐκπλήττει καὶ ἀγαπᾶται μᾶλλον τῆς ἀμύθου καὶ ἀπλάστου περὶ μέτρον καὶ λέξιν κατασκευῆς. ὅθεν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔκ τινων ἐνυπνίων ποιητικῆς ἁψάμενος αὐτὸς μέν, ἅτε δὴ γεγονὼς ἀληθείας ἀγωνιστὴς τὸν ἅπαντα βίον, οὐ πιθανὸς ἦν οὐδ’ εὐφυὴς ψευδῶν δημιουργός, τοὺς δ’ Αἰσώπου μύθους ἔπεσιν ἐνήρμοζεν ὡς ποίησιν οὐκ οὖσαν ᾗ ψεῦδος μὴ πρόσεστι.

On Curbing Temper and Intemperance: Plutarch, How to Study Poetry 31b-c

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“It is a wonderful mark of forethought not to miss the fact that you have an uncontrollable temper and just be difficult and emotional by nature, but instead handle it well and be on guard against causes of anger and to defer them by considering the matter beforehand in order not to unwillingly descend into such suffering, is a mark of wondrous forethought. A similar approach toward wine is best for someone fond of drinking or toward sex for the rather lusty among us.”

τὸ γὰρ ἐπισφαλῶς πρὸς ὀργὴν ἔχοντα καὶ φύσει τραχὺν ὄντα καὶ θυμοειδῆ μὴ λανθάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ’ ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν τῷ λογισμῷ πόρρωθεν ὅπως οὐδ’ ἄκων τῷ πάθει περιπεσεῖται, θαυμαστῆς ἐστι προνοίας. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ καὶ πρὸς μέθην τὸν φίλοινον ἔχειν καὶ πρὸς ἔρωτα τὸν ἐρωτικόν•

Anger Lashes Out at Anything: Plutarch, On Controlling Anger 455c

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“It is best, as one might gather, to be in control and either to depart and conceal ourselves, anchoring oneself into some quiet place, just as if we perceive that a seizure is beginning, that we might not fall—or rather, that we might not fall on someone else. We most often turn on our friends; for we neither love everyone, nor envy everyone, nor fear everyone to the extent that there is anything that is untouched or untried by anger. We grow angry with enemies, children, parents the gods, by Zeus, with wild animals and even with lifeless tools…”

ἀτρεμεῖν οὖν κράτιστον ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ἀποκρύπτειν καὶ καθορμίζειν ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἡσυχίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπιληψίας ἀρχομένης συναισθανομένους, ἵνα μὴ πέσωμεν μᾶλλον δ’ ἐπιπέσωμεν· ἐπιπίπτομεν δὲ τοῖς φίλοις μάλιστά γε καὶ πλειστάκις, οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἐρῶμεν οὐδὲ πᾶσι φθονοῦμεν οὐδὲ πάντας φοβούμεθα, θυμῷ δ’ ἄθικτον οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἀνεπιχείρητον, ἀλλ’ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ πολεμίοις καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ θεοῖς νὴ Δία καὶ θηρίοις καὶ ἀψύχοις σκεύεσιν…