Obvious Perjury Without a Charge

Plutarch, Sayings of the Romans (Moralia 200e) Scipio the Younger 13

“When [P. Africanus] saw Gaius Licinius approaching, he said ‘I know that this man has committed perjury, but since no one else is accusing him, I can’t be accuser and judge at the same time”

 Γάιον δὲ Λικίνιον ἰδὼν παρερχόμενον, “οἶδα,” ἔφη, “τοῦτον ἐπιωρκηκότα τὸν ἄνδρα· μηδενὸς δὲ κατηγοροῦντος, οὐ δύναμαι κατήγορος αὐτὸς εἶναι καὶ δικαστής.”

Cicero, Pro Cluentio 134

“It seems impossible to me not to mention the example of the great and most famous man P. Africanus who, when he was in the office of censor of knights, oversaw he appearance of G. Licinius Sacerdos.  When he came forward he said in a voice loud enough for the whole assembly to hear that this man had committed perjury intentionally and that if anyone would bring charges against him, he would provide his own testimony.

When no one spoke to do so, he told him to “lead on his horse.” In this way, one whose judgment the Roman people and foreign states were accustomed to trusting was not certain enough with his own knowledge to judge another.”

Non enim mihi exemplum summi et clarissimi viri, P. Africani, praetereundum videtur: qui cum esset censor et in equitum censu C. Licinius Sacerdos prodisset, clara voce, ut omnis contio audire possit, dixit se scire illum verbis conceptis peierasse: si qui contra vellet dicere, usurum esse eum suo testimonio: deinde cum nemo contra diceret, iussit equum traducere. Ita is, cuius arbitrio et populus Romanus et exterae gentes contentae esse consuerant, ipse sua scientia ad ignominiam alterius contentus non fuit.

Cicero seems to take a different lesson from this than others. Where other examples seem to imply Scipio avoiding making a charge based on ethical restraints, Cicero implies that Scipio did not have enough faith in his own knowledge to besmirch a man’s reputation. Valerius Maximus echoes Plutarch.

Val. Max. Memorable Deeds and Words 4. 1.10b

“But then, because no one took up the charge, [Africanus] said “Take your horse across, Sacerdos and be free of the censor’s judgment so that I may not seem to play the part of accuser, witness, and judge against you.”

sed nullo ad id negotium accedente ‘transduc equum’ inquit, ‘Sacerdos, ac lucrifac censoriam notam, ne ego in tua persona et accusatoris et testis et iudicis partes egisse videar.’

Quintilian: Advice for Judging Great Authors

Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 10.1.24-26

“Let the reader not be persuaded as a matter of course that everything the best authors said is perfect. For they slip at times, they give in to their burdens, and they delight in the pleasure of their own abilities. They do not always pay attention; and they often grow tired. Demosthenes seems to doze to Cicero; Homer naps for Horace. Truly, they are great, but they are still mortals and it happens that those who believe that whatever appears in these authors should be laws for speaking often imitate their lesser parts, since this is easier—and they believe they are enough like them if they emulate the faults of great authors.

Still, one must pass judgment on these men with modesty and care to avoid what often happens when people condemn what they do not understand. If it is necessary to err in either part, I would prefer readers to enjoy everything in these authors rather than dismiss much.”

Neque id statim legenti persuasum sit, omnia quae summi auctores dixerint utique esse perfecta. Nam et labuntur aliquando et oneri cedunt et indulgent ingeniorum suorum voluptati, nec semper intendunt animum, nonnumquam fatigantur, cum Ciceroni dormitare interim Demosthenes, Horatio vero etiam Homerus ipse videatur.  Summi enim sunt, homines tamen, acciditque iis qui quidquid apud illos reppererunt dicendi legem putant ut deteriora imitentur (id enim est facilius), ac se abunde similes putent si vitia magnorum consequantur. Modesto tamen et circumspecto iudicio de tantis viris pronuntiandum est, ne, quod plerisque accidit, damnent quae non intellegunt. Ac si necesse est in alteram errare partem, omnia eorum legentibus placere quam multa displicere maluerim.

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Two Romans Disagree on Athens — Lucretius and Sallust

From Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura:

 

“Athens, that famous name, first gave to sickly man
Fruit bearing crops long ago and with them
Created life anew and called for laws
And first offered the sweet comforts of life
When she produced a man with such a soul
That he once divulged everything from his truth-telling tongue.
Though his life has ended, thanks to his divine discoveries,
His glory has been carried abroad and now nears the heavens.
For he saw then that everything which is needed for life
Has already been set aside for mortal man and that
As far as they were able, their life was already safe…”
Primae frugiparos fetus mortalibus aegris
dididerunt quondam praeclaro nomine Athenae
et recreaverunt vitam legesque rogarunt
et primae dederunt solacia dulcia vitae,
cum genuere virum tali cum corde repertum,
omnia veridico qui quondam ex ore profudit;
cuius et extincti propter divina reperta
divolgata vetus iam ad caelum gloria fertur.
nam cum vidit hic ad victum quae flagitat usus
omnia iam ferme mortalibus esse parata
et, pro quam possent, vitam consistere tutam…
The man at Athens? Epicurus, of course.

Sallust, Bellum Catilinae 8

“The achievements of the Athenians were, as I see it, great and magnificent enough, but perhaps a little less so than is commonly believed. But, because the most talented writers happened to go there, the achievements of the Athenians are celebrated throughout the world as the greatest ever.”

Atheniensium res gestae, sicuti ego aestumo, satis amplae magnificaeque fuere, verum aliquanto minores tamen, quam fama feruntur.  Sed quia provenere ibi scriptorum magna ingenia, per terrarum orbem Atheniensium facta pro maxumis celebrantur.

 

Athens

 

Velleius Paterculus has his own take on this:

 

“My wonder passes from clustering in certain times to cities. A solitary Attic city bloomed with more works of every kind of eloquence than the rest of Greece together, to the point that you might believe that the bodies of that race were separated into different cities, but that the geniuses were enclosed only within the walls of Athens. I find this no more surprising than the fact that no Argive, Theban or Spartan was considered worthy of note while he was alive or after he died. These cities, though preeminent for other things, were intellectually infertile, except for Pindar’s single voice which graced Thebes—for the Laconians mark Alcman as their own wrongly.”

[18] Transit admiratio ab conditione temporum et ad urbium. Una urbs Attica pluribus omnis eloquentiae quam universa Graecia operibus usque floruit adeo ut corpora gentis illius separata sint in alias civitates, ingenia vero solis Atheniensium muris clausa existimes. 2 Neque hoc ego magis miratus sim quam neminem Argivum Thebanum Lacedaemonium oratorem aut dum vixit auctoritate aut post mortem memoria dignum existimatum. 3 Quae urbes eximiae alias talium studiorum fuere steriles, nisi Thebas unum os Pindari inluminaret: nam Alcmana Lacones falso sibi vindicant.

Here Velleius moves from the clustering of intellects in time to their clustering in space. Although, to be fair, it seems that one would be impossible without the other…

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Corrupt Leaders Make Corrupt Countries: Hesiod, Works and Days, 217-229

“Oath runs right alongside crooked judgments.
But a roar comes from Justice as she is dragged where
bribe-devouring men lead when they apply laws with crooked judgments.
She attends the city and the haunts of the hosts
weeping and cloaked in mist, bringing evil to men
who drive her out and do not practice righteous law.
For those who give fair judgments to foreigners and citizens
and who do not transgress the law in any way,
cities grow strong, and the people flourish within them;
A child-nourishing peace settles on the land, and never
Does wide-browed Zeus sound the sign of harsh war.”

αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει ῞Ορκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν·
τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἑλκομένης ᾗ κ’ ἄνδρες ἄγωσι
δωροφάγοι, σκολιῇς δὲ δίκῃς κρίνωσι θέμιστας·
ἣ δ’ ἕπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἤθεα λαῶν,
ἠέρα ἑσσαμένη, κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα,
οἵ τέ μιν ἐξελάσωσι καὶ οὐκ ἰθεῖαν ἔνειμαν.
οἳ δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι διδοῦσιν
ἰθείας καὶ μή τι παρεκβαίνουσι δικαίου,
τοῖσι τέθηλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ’ ἀνθεῦσιν ἐν αὐτῇ·
εἰρήνη δ’ ἀνὰ γῆν κουροτρόφος, οὐδέ ποτ’ αὐτοῖς
ἀργαλέον πόλεμον τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς·

Logic, Anger, Ladies and Death: The Fragmenta Sedis Incertae of Theognis

The Megaran Elegiac poet Theognis leaves us over a thousand lines of conventional advice presented in a traditional order. Four couplets attributed to him (or his tradition) don’t fit into this order and are thus “fragments of uncertain place” (Fragmenta Sedis Incertae). I don’t know if I read them before today; but I am certain they’re worth reading again:

“Logic is in the habit of inflicting upon men, Kurnos
The many stumbles of troubled judgment.”

Πολλὰ φέρειν εἴωθε λόγος θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσιν
πταίσματα τῆς γνώμης, Κύρνε, ταρασσομένης.

“Nothing, Kurnos, is more unjust than anger, which pains
The man who has it even as it appeals to the baser parts of his heart.”

Οὐδέν, Κύρν’, ὀργῆς ἀδικώτερον, ἣ τὸν ἔχοντα
πημαίνει θυμῶι δειλὰ χαριζομένη.

“Nothing, Kurnos, is sweeter than a good woman.
I am a witness to this, and you are witness to the truth”

Οὐδέν, Κύρν’, ἀγαθῆς γλυκερώτερόν ἐστι γυναικός.
μάρτυς ἐγώ, σὺ δ’ ἐμοὶ γίνου ἀληθοσύνης.

“Even now the sea’s corpse calls me home,
But when dead, I will sound through the mouth of a living man”

῎Ηδη γάρ με κέκληκε θαλάσσιος οἴκαδε νεκρός,
τεθνηκὼς ζωιῶι φθεγγόμενος στόματι.

Hesiod, Fr. 338

“Don’t render judgment before you hear both sides.”

μηδὲ δίκην δικάσηις, πρὶν ἄμφω μῦθον ἀκούσηις

There is some clause-ending rhyme here, perhaps for mnemonic and rhetorical effect (mayde dikayn dikasays, prin ampho moothon akousays). Sort of like the “if the glove doesn’t fit you must acquit” of the ancient world…

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