Petrarch, On the Remedies of Fortune Both Good and Bad (1.1.9:
You read in Sallust that there was in that most crime-steeped man, Catiline, enough eloquence but too little wisdom. Nor indeed did he seek any glory for that eloquence – although a more elevated judgment might consider it not eloquence, but loquacity. For one cannot be a true orator, that is to say the master of eloquence, unless he is also a good man. If you, being good and wise yourself, thought that this impetus for words, which is often found in the talkative and shameless, or that this experience in speaking was enough for oratorical glory and the perfect gift of eloquence, then you have been deceived. Volubility of language, a stock of words, and even a certain verbal art can be the common property of criminals and pious people alike. What you are looking for belongs to the good – not all of them, to be sure, but to very few, such that all wicked people have no part in the praise for which virtue and wisdom (spiritual goods which they lack) are required.
If you can’t understand it this way, I will explain. But keep in mind two things of which I speak: distinctions come to mind, one of Cato and the other of Cicero. One says, “The orator is the good man versed in speaking.” But the other says that “Eloquence is nothing but wisdom speaking copiously.” From these tags you can see that both goodness and wisdom are needed for the essence of the speaker and of eloquence, and yet they are not enough without both experience and copiousness. So, as the first two qualities may be enough to make a man good and wise, these others alone make him neither good, nor wise, nor even eloquent, but loquacious. All taken together, however, bring the orator and his art to completion, which is to be sure a rarer and loftier thing than those who hope to find it in abundant speech. Therefore, if you are looking for the name of orator and the true palm of eloquence, study virtue and wisdom first.
Satis eloquentie, parum sapientie fuisse in homine illo scelestissimo Catilina apud Crispum legis, neque is quidem gloriam eloquentie quesivit ullam — quamquam altiore iudicio non eloquentia, sed loquacitas illa fuit —. Verus enim orator, hoc est eloquentie magister, nisi vir bonus esse non potest. Quod si bonus et sapiens putabas ad oratorias laudes perfectumque munus eloquentie hunc verborum impetum, qui sepe procacibus atque inverecundis uberior est, sive hanc ipsam dicendi peritiam satis esse, fallebaris: lingue volubilitas et verborum copia atque etiam ars quedam sceleratis piisque communia esse possunt; id quod queris bonorum est, non omnium quidem, sed paucissimorum, ita ut mali omnes huius laudis exortes sint, ad quam scilicet animi bona quibus carent, virtus ac sapientia, requiruntur.
Quod si sic esse non intelligas, dicam. Sed memineris duarum, de quibus loquor, rerum: diffinitiones in mentem redeant, quarum altera Catonis, Ciceronis est altera. Ille ait: “Orator est vir bonus dicendi peritus”; iste autem “nichil est” inquit “aliud eloquentia nisi copiose loquens sapientia”. Ex his vides ad oratoris atque eloquentie essentiam et bonitatem et sapientiam exigi nec tamen sufficere, nisi et peritia adsit et copia. Ita ut prime ille due virum bonum sapientemque duntaxat, he autem sole nec bonum nec sapientem nec eloquentem quidem efficiant sed loquacem, omnes vero coniuncte perficiant oratorem eiusque artificium, quod profecto rarius atque altius est quam putent qui in multiloquio situm sperant. Tu ergo, si oratoris nomen et eloquentie veram laudem queris, virtuti et sapientie primum stude.
