Plotinus, Ennead 6.7
And the following cannot be dismissed, what some super-cranky man might say, that “you people, why do you puff yourselves up and down with words, claiming that life is good, saying that thought is good, and that there is something beyond these things? Why should thought be good? Or what that is good can the thinker of the ideal forms derive while he hunts for each of them? If he is deceived and feels pleasure in them, well then he might soon say that it is god and that life is because it is pleasant.
But what if he remains in a state free of pleasure, why would he call them good? Is it just because this exists? What difference could there be in existing or totally not existing, unless someone establishes affinity for these things as the cause for it? Then, he would have to concede that the good of these things is posited because of this natural kind of deception and fear of the loss of these things.”
κἀκεῖνο δὲ οὐκ ἀφετέον, ὃ τάχ᾿ ἄν τις δυσχεραντικὸς ἀνὴρ εἴποι, ὡς “ὑμεῖς, ὦ οὗτοι, τί δὴ ἀποσεμνύνετε τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ζωὴν20ἀγαθὸν λέγοντες καὶ νοῦν ἀγαθὸν λέγοντες καί τι ἐπέκεινα τούτων; τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀγαθὸν εἴη; ἢ τί ὁ νοῶν τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ ἀγαθὸν ἔχοι αὐτὸ ἕκαστον θερῶν; ἠπατημένος μὲν γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἡδόμενος ἐπὶ τούτοις τάχα ἂν ἀγαθὸν λέγοι καὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἡδεῖαν οὖσαν· στὰς δ᾿ ἐν 25τῷ ἀνήδονος εἶναι διὰ τί ἂν φήσειν ἀγαθά; ἢ τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι; τί γαρ ἂν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι καρπώσαιτο; ἢ τί ἂν διαφέροι ἐν τῷ εἶναι ἢ ὅλως μὴ εἶναι, εἰ μή τις τὴν πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλίαν αἰτίαν τούτων θεῖτο; ὥστε διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀπάτην φυσικὴν οὖσαν καὶ τὸν φόβον τῆς φθορᾶς τὴν 30τῶν ἀγαθῶν νομισθῆναι θέσιν.”