Tag: Virtue

The Outstanding Virtue

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Bacchylides 14. 1-18.

It’s best when men receive a good allotment from god.
But heavy fate comes, destroying the good man
And, when set right, even making the bad man shine bright.
There are different honors for different men.

Men’s virtues are countless,
But one stands out from them all:
That a man manages what comes with a just heart.

The lyre’s voice and the clear-sounding choruses
Are not meet for grief-sowing battles,
And neither is the clang of clashing bronze for celebrations.
No, for everything men do there’s a time that’s best.
When a man’s at his best, a god is guiding him too.

εὖ μὲν εἱμάρθαι παρὰ δαίμονος ἀν-
θρώποις ἄριστον:
συμφορὰ δ᾽ ἐσθλόν τ᾽ ἀμαλδύ-
νει βαρύτλατος μολοῦσα
κἀἰ τὸν κακὸν ὑψιφανῆ τεύ-
χει κατορθωθεῖσα: τιμὰν
δ᾽ ἄλλος ἀλλοίαν ἔχει:
μυρίαι δ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἀρεταί, μία δ᾽ ἐκ
πασᾶν πρόκειται,
ὃς τὰ πὰρ χειρὸς κυβερνᾶ-
ται δικαίαισι φρένεσσιν.
οὔτ᾽ ἐν βαρυπενθέσιν ἁρμό-
ζει μάχαις φόρμιγγος ὀμφὰ
καὶ λιγυκλαγγεῖς χοροί,
οὔτ᾽ ἐν θαλίαις καναχὰ
χαλκόκτυπος: ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ
καιρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἔργματι κάλ-
λιστος: εὖ ἔρδοντα δὲ καὶ θεὸς ὀρθοῖ.

Picture of street sign that originally said "Men Working" but has graffiti added to it saying" on healing".
A street sign in Brooklyn.

Larry Benn has a B.A. in English Literature from Harvard College, an M.Phil in English Literature from Oxford University, and a J.D. from Yale Law School. Making amends for a working life misspent in finance, he’s now a hobbyist in ancient languages and blogs at featsofgreek.blogspot.com.

The Countless Lives Within Us

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Seneca, Moral Epistle 113.2-3

People agree that the soul is alive since it has the ability to make us alive and because “living things” have their name from it [anima, animal]. Virtue, moreover, is little more than a soul keeping itself a certain way. So, virtue is alive. In turn, virtue does something and nothing can do a thing without impetus. So, if a thing has impetus, then it has to be alive, since nothing has impetus unless it is alive.

A response might be that “if virtue is alive, then virtue itself has virtue.” Well, why wouldn’t it!? Just as a wise person does everything through virtue, so to does virtue accomplish its goals through itself. “Therefore, ” people continue, “all the arts are also alive and our thoughts and everything the mind contains with it.  So it follows that thousands of living things make their home in the narrows of a person’s heart and that each one of are made up many creatures or have many within us

Animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat, ut simus animalia, cum ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint. Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens; ergo animal est. Deinde virtus agit aliquid; agi autem nihil sine impetu potest. Si impetum habet, qui nulli est nisi animali, animal est. “Si animal est,” inquit, “virtus, habet ipsa virtutem.” Quidni habeat se ipsam? Quomodo 3sapiens omnia per virtutem gerit, sic virtus per se. “Ergo,” inquit, “et omnes artes animalia sunt et omnia, quae cogitamus quaeque mente conplectimur. Sequitur, ut multa millia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris, et singuli multa simus animalia aut multa habeamus animalia.”

Picture of a crowd of people with the Latin aut multa habeamus animalia. This means "each one of are made up many creatures or have many within us"

Sad About Other People’s Riches

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Seneca, Moral Epistles 93.32-34

“I dare say that the soul knows  that riches are kept apart from where they are stored: the soul should be filled instead of a treasure chest. The soul should be in charge of all things and should be positioned as the owner of the nature of things so that the boundary of its realm should be the rising and the setting of the sun like the gods; that the soul may also gaze down upon the wealthy thanks to its own riches–none of them are as happy in their own possessions as they are sad about other people’s riches.

When the spirit rises to this sublime peak, it treats the body too not as a lover of a required burden but as a steward and is not subservient to the thing that it governs.. For no one is free if they are enslaved to their body. Truly,  provided you pass over the rest of the masters created by excessive concern to the body, the power it exerts is distracting yet sophisticated. From here, it leaves with an equal spirit or an exulted one, but once it has departed has no concern for the future of the flesh left behind.

But just as we neglect the clippings from our beards and hair, in the same way, when the divine spirit is about the leave the person that acted as a vessel to carry it, it cares as little as a baby just born does about afterbirth about the body, whether it is burned, or covered with stone, or interred, or fed to wild animals.”

Scit, inquam, aliubi positas esse divitias quam quo congeruntur; animum impleri debere, non arcam. Hunc inponere dominio rerum omnium licet, hunc in possessionem rerum naturae inducere, ut sua

rientis occidentisque terminis finiat1 deorumque ritu cuncta possideat, cum opibus suis divites superne despiciat, quorum nemo tam suo laetus est quam tristis alieno. Cum se in hanc sublimitatem tulit, corporis quoque ut3 oneris necessarii non amator, sed procurator est nec se illi, cui inpositus est, subicit. Nemo liber est, qui corpori servit. Nam ut alios dominos, quos nimia pro illo sollicitudo invenit, transeas, ipsius morosum imperium delicatumque 34est. Ab hoc modo aequo animo exit, modo magno prosilit, nec quis deinde relicti eius futurus sit exitus quaerit. Sed ut ex barba capilloque tonsa neglegimus, ita ille divinus animus egressurus hominem, quo receptaculum suum conferatur, ignis illud exurat an lapis includat4 an terra contegat an ferae distrahant, non magis ad se iudicat pertinere quam secundas ad editum infantem.

a pile of ancient greek coins on a black background
From Izmir, From another hoard found at Clazomenae, with coins from the 4th century BC.

It’s Not the Hand You’re Dealt

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Seneca, Moral Epistle 85.40-41

“Phidias didn’t know how to make sculptures from only ivory! He used to craft them from bronze too. If he had been given marble or some simpler material, he would have created the best sculpture possible for that material.

So, a wise person will demonstrate virtue among wealth, if they can, or among poverty, if they cannot; in their homeland, or in exile; as a general, if not as a soldier. If they can, in health, or disabled. Whatever fortune they receive, they will make something  memorable from it.

Animal tamers are skilled–they know how to accustom the most savage animals to obey human commands. But they are not happy merely with excising their wildness until they make them calm enough to sleep in their beds. The master puts his hand in lion’s mouths and the tiger is kissed by his keepers. A small Ethiopian orders an elephant to lower to its knees or to walk on a tightrope.

In the same way, the wise person is a master of taming evils. Grief, need, shame, prison, and exile should be feared; but meeting a wise person tames them.”

Non ex ebore tantum Phidias sciebat facere simulacra; faciebat ex aere. Si marmor illi, si adhuc viliorem materiam obtulisses, fecisset, quale ex illa fieri optimum posset. Sic sapiens virtutem, si licebit, in divitiis explicabit, si minus, in paupertate; si poterit, in patria, si minus, in exilio; si poterit, imperator, si minus, miles; si poterit, integer, si minus, debilis. Quamcumque fortunam acceperit, aliquid ex illa memorabile efficiet.

Certi sunt domitores ferarum, qui saevissima animalia et ad occursum expavescenda hominem pati subigunt nec asperitatem excussisse contenti usque in contubernium mitigant. Leonibus magister manum insertat, osculatur tigrim suus custos, elephantum minimus Aethiops iubet subsidere in genua et ambulare per funem. Sic sapiens artifex est domandi mala. Dolor, egestas, ignominia, carcer, exilium ubique horrenda, cum ad hunc pervenere, mansueta sunt. Vale.

Photograph o a carved elephant. On a pedastal, it is turned to the side looking forward with trunk moving laterally to face the viewer
Elephant by Bernini, in the Piazza della Minerva, Rome

A Sweet Evil: Schadenfreude in Ancient Greek

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From the Suda

“Epikhairekakía: is pleasure at someone else’s troubles”

ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς

Diogenes Laertius, Vita Philosophorum 7. 114

“Pleasure is irrational excitement at gaining what seems to be needed. As a subset of pleasure, are elation, pleasure at someone else’s pain (epikhairekakía) and delight, which is similar to turning (trepsis), a mind’s inclination to weakness. The embrace of pleasure is the surrender of virtue.”

῾Ηδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, ὑφ’ ἣν τάττεται κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις. κήλησις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ δι’ ὤτων κατακηλοῦσα· ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· τέρψις δέ, οἷον τρέψις, προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειμένον· διάχυσις δ’ ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1107a 8-11

“There are some vices whose names are cloaked with evil, for instance, pleasure at evils [epikhairekakía], shamelessness, and envy; and there are deeds too: adultery, theft, and manslaughter. All these things and those of this sort are called evil on their own, it is not an indulgence in them or an improper use that is wrong.”

ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία
ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ’ αἱ ἐλλείψεις.

Image result for Ancient Greek Vase party

Patience, The Greatest Virtue?

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Dicta Catonis 1.38

“Defeat one you could destroy with an enduring mind.
Patience is the greatest virtue of human kind.”

Quem superare potes interdum vince ferendo;
maxima enim est hominum semper patientia virtus.

Seneca, De Beneficiis 30

“Often, a thing which patience could unravel is torn by a violent tug.”

Saepe, quod explicari pertinacia potuit, violentia trahentis abruptum est

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1100b-1100a

“Still, nobility shines bright even in tough times, when someone bears even many severe misfortunes patiently, not because they cannot sense them, but because of their unselfishness and greatness of spirit. If the actions one takes rules their life—as we just said—then none of the happy people can ever be miserable.”

ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι᾿ ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δ᾿ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος.

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 14

“I do not deny that pain is painful—otherwise, why would bravery be desired? But I do say that it is suppressed through patience, if we possess any amount at all. If we have none, then why do we raise philosophy on high and robe ourselves in its glory?

Non ego dolorem dolorem esse nego,—cur enim fortitudo desideraretur?—sed eum opprimi dico patientia, si modo est aliqua patientia: si nulla est, quid exornamus philosophiam aut quid eius nomine gloriosi sumus?

Pin on The Simpsons (The Golden Era)

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 11. 6

“Whenever you are really angry and upset, [remember] that human life is short and soon we will all be in the ground.”

ὅταν λίαν ἀγανακτῇς ἢ καὶ δυσπαθῇς, ἀκαριαῖος ὁ ἀνθρώπειος βίος καὶ μετ᾿ ὀλίγον πάντες ἐξετάθημεν.

 

A Sweet Evil: Schadenfreude in Ancient Greek

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From the Suda

“Epikhairekakía: is pleasure at someone else’s troubles”

ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς

Diogenes Laertius, Vita Philosophorum 7. 114

“Pleasure is irrational excitement at gaining what seems to be needed. As a subset of pleasure, are elation, pleasure at someone else’s pain (epikhairekakía) and delight, which is similar to turning (trepsis), a mind’s inclination to weakness. The embrace of pleasure is the surrender of virtue.”

῾Ηδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, ὑφ’ ἣν τάττεται κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις. κήλησις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ δι’ ὤτων κατακηλοῦσα· ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· τέρψις δέ, οἷον τρέψις, προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειμένον· διάχυσις δ’ ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1107a 8-11

“There are some vices whose names are cloaked with evil, for instance, pleasure at evils [epikhairekakía], shamelessness, and envy; and there are deeds too: adultery, theft, and manslaughter. All these things and those of this sort are called evil on their own, it is not an indulgence in them or an improper use that is wrong.”

ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία
ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ’ αἱ ἐλλείψεις.

Image result for Ancient Greek Vase party

Virtue and the Arts: Some Aristotle to Start Your Day

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Some Aristotle for this morning. I don’t think I actually believe the third point–because I suspect that insisting that human character is constant and consistent is actually (1) wrong and (2) impacts mental health negatively. But I like the beginning and the emphasis on that Aristotelian notion that doing something makes you something...

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.2-4

“Or is this also true in the arts? For spelling a word accidentally or with someone else guiding you is possible. Then, one will be a scholar if he spells something the way a scholar does, by which I mean according to the scholarly art itself. In addition, there is no real similarity between the arts and virtue. For the products of art are good in themselves—it suffices if they develop while having their own quality.

But acts of virtue don’t have their own intrinsic quality and are performed wisely or justly, but if the person who does them acts in a certain way. First, he must understand what he does. Second, he must choose to do it and for its own nature. And, third, he must act from a fixed and constant character. None of these conditions are necessary for the other arts apart from understanding the act. But knowledge is of little or no importance for the virtues while the other conditions are not minor but rather everything, if truly [virtue] emerges from repeatedly doing just and wise things.”

ἢ οὐδ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου· τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς, τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐστὶ [τὸ] κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμματικήν. ἔτι οὐδ᾿ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν αὐτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ᾿ ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι᾿ αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἐὰν βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ᾿ ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, εἴπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται.

Image result for Medieval manuscript aristotle ethics papyrus
Brtitish Library, Constitution of the Athenians

Patience, The Greatest Virtue?

~ sententiaeantiquae ~ 1 Comment

Dicta Catonis 1.38

“Defeat one you could destroy with an enduring mind.
Patience is the greatest virtue of human kind.”

Quem superare potes interdum vince ferendo;
maxima enim est hominum semper patientia virtus.

Seneca, De Beneficiis 30

“Often, a thing which patience could unravel is torn by a violent tug.”

Saepe, quod explicari pertinacia potuit, violentia trahentis abruptum est

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1100b-1100a

“Still, nobility shines bright even in tough times, when someone bears even many severe misfortunes patiently, not because they cannot sense them, but because of their unselfishness and greatness of spirit. If the actions one takes rules their life—as we just said—then none of the happy people can ever be miserable.”

ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι᾿ ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δ᾿ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος.

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 14

“I do not deny that pain is painful—otherwise, why would bravery be desired? But I do say that it is suppressed through patience, if we possess any amount at all. If we have none, then why do we raise philosophy on high and robe ourselves in its glory?

Non ego dolorem dolorem esse nego,—cur enim fortitudo desideraretur?—sed eum opprimi dico patientia, si modo est aliqua patientia: si nulla est, quid exornamus philosophiam aut quid eius nomine gloriosi sumus?

Pin on The Simpsons (The Golden Era)

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 11. 6

“Whenever you are really angry and upset, [remember] that human life is short and soon we will all be in the ground.”

ὅταν λίαν ἀγανακτῇς ἢ καὶ δυσπαθῇς, ἀκαριαῖος ὁ ἀνθρώπειος βίος καὶ μετ᾿ ὀλίγον πάντες ἐξετάθημεν.

A Sweet Evil: Schadenfreude in Ancient Greek

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From the Suda

“Epikhairekakía: is pleasure at someone else’s troubles”

ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς

Diogenes Laertius, Vita Philosophorum 7. 114

“Pleasure is irrational excitement at gaining what seems to be needed. As a subset of pleasure, are elation, pleasure at someone else’s pain (epikhairekakía) and delight, which is similar to turning (trepsis), a mind’s inclination to weakness. The embrace of pleasure is the surrender of virtue.”

῾Ηδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, ὑφ’ ἣν τάττεται κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις. κήλησις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ δι’ ὤτων κατακηλοῦσα· ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· τέρψις δέ, οἷον τρέψις, προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειμένον· διάχυσις δ’ ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1107a 8-11

“There are some vices whose names are cloaked with evil, for instance, pleasure at evils [epikhairekakía], shamelessness, and envy; and there are deeds too: adultery, theft, and manslaughter. All these things and those of this sort are called evil on their own, it is not an indulgence in them or an improper use that is wrong.”

ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία
ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ’ αἱ ἐλλείψεις.

Plutarch, On Being A Busybody 518C

“Envy is pain over another person’s good things; schadenfreude is pleasure at another person’s sufferings. Both feelings arise from raw and animalistic hurt, from bad character.”

φθόνος μὲν γάρ ἐστι λύπη ἐπ᾿ ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, ἐπιχαιρεκακία δ᾿ ἡδονὴ ἐπ᾿ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· ἀμφότερα δ᾿ ἐκ πάθους ἀνημέρου καὶ θηριώδους γεγένηται τῆς κακοηθείας.

Hieronymous Bosch, The Garden of Earthly Delights, right wing