Tag: Plutarch

Alcibiades Punches his Teacher Over Homer (Plutarch, Alc. 7.1)

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Last year, a fine correspondent on twitter posted the following comment:

Of course,  I had to check it out. It turns out that it is just spot on and there’s a coda:

“As Alcibiades passed from childhood he visited a teacher and asked for a book of Homer. When that teacher said that he didn’t have any Homer, Alcibiades set upon him with his fist and left. When another teacher said that he had a copy of Homer which he had corrected himself, Alcibiades said, “Why do you teach the alphabet when you’re good enough to correct Homer,–why don’t you teach young men?”

Τὴν δὲ παιδικὴν ἡλικίαν παραλλάσσων ἐπέστη γραμματοδιδασκαλείῳ καὶ βιβλίον ᾔτησεν ῾Ομηρικόν. εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ διδασκάλου μηδὲν ἔχειν ῾Ομήρου, κονδύλῳ καθικόμενος αὐτοῦ παρῆλθεν. ἑτέρου δὲ φήσαντος ἔχειν ῞Ομηρον ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ διωρθωμένον, „εἶτα” ἔφη „γράμματα διδάσκεις ῞Ομηρον ἐπανορθοῦν ἱκανὸς ὤν, οὐχὶ τοὺς νέους παιδεύεις;”

In Plutarch, these anecdotes serve to characterize the brash character of Alcibiades, one that combines daring and intelligence in a way that anticipates his later deeds. (Because, as we know, Plutarch thinks anecdotes are more telling than great deeds).

In Plato’s spurious Alcibiades 1, Socrates asks his younger interlocutor if he has heard about justice and injustice from Homer (112b2) and in Alcibiades 2 he focuses on the riddle of Homer in the Margites:

Alcibiades II 147 D

“For surely you don’t seem to be ignorant that Homer, the most divine and wisest poet, is not able to know badly—for he says in the Margites that he knows many things but he knows them all badly—but instead I think that he riddles by using the adverb badly instead of the noun “base”, and using “he knew” instead of “knowing”….

οὐ γὰρ δήπου ῞Ομηρόν γε τὸν θειότατόν τε καὶ σοφώτατον ποιητὴν ἀγνοεῖν δοκεῖς ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπίστασθαι κακῶς—ἐκεῖνος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λέγων τὸν Μαργίτην πολλὰ μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, κακῶς δέ, φησί, πάντα ἠπίστατο—ἀλλ’ αἰνίττεται οἶμαι παράγων τὸ κακῶς μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἠπίστατο ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι·

So it may be that Alcibiades was expecting a philosopher and just got a school teacher.  But what do I know? I teach γράμματα, but sometimes τοὺς νέους.

According to Aelian (Varia Historia, 3.28), Socrates attempted to deal with Alcibiades’ ego by invoking geography:

“When Socrates noticed that Alkibiades was all puffed up because of his wealth and proud thanks to his property especially because of his lands, he led him to some part of the city where a tablet stood marked with an outline of the earth. He requested for Alkibiades to find Attica. When he found it, he asked him to find his own properties. When he responded “but they are not marked on here,” Socrates said “You think so highly of these things which don’t even amount to a fragment of the earth?”

῾Ορῶν ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ᾿Αλκιβιάδην τετυφωμένον ἐπὶ τῷ πλούτῳ καὶ μέγα φρονοῦντα ἐπὶ τῇ περιουσίᾳ καὶ ἔτι πλέον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγροῖς, ἤγαγεν αὐτὸν ἔς τινα τῆς πόλεως τόπον ἔνθα ἀνέκειτο πινάκιον ἔχον γῆς περίοδον, καὶ προσέταξε τῷ ᾿Αλκιβιάδῃ τὴν ᾿Αττικὴν ἐνταῦθ’ ἀναζητεῖν. ὡς δ’ εὗρε, προσέταξεν αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἰδίους διαθρῆσαι. τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος ‘ἀλλ’ οὐδαμοῦ γεγραμμένοι εἰσίν’ ‘ἐπὶ τούτοις οὖν’ εἶπε ‘μέγα φρονεῖς, οἵπερ οὐδὲν μέρος τῆς γῆς εἰσιν;’

Others in Athens were less constructive in remonstrating with the dashing young man. We have a line mocking him from the comedian Pherecrates (fr. 164):

 

“Even though Alcibiades isn’t a man, as it seems, he’s already husband to all the ladies.”
οὐκ ὤν ἀνὴρ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὡς δοκεῖ,
ἀνὴρ ἁπασῶν τῶν γυναικῶν ἐστι νῦν…

This plays on the dual connotations of ἀνὴρ as sexually mature man and husband. In the modern world, such a line might not be considered insulting. But in certain circles in Athens, manly men were mainly interested in men.

Swift Reprisal for Evil Done is Best for All Involved? Plutarch, “On Divine Procrastination in Vengeance”

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Plutarch’s De Sera Numinis Vindicta (Moralia 548c-e)

“Patrokleas responded, “The slowness and procrastination of the deity’s punishment of the wicked seems to me to be especially terrible. Now, too, I am compelled and renewed by these words even as long ago I was moved when I heard Euripides saying “[Apollo] delays, this is the nature of the gods.”

Certainly, it is not right for god to delay in anything, least of all in punishing the wicked, men who are far from slow themselves, who are never procrastinators of doing evil, but who are driven by piercing passions into their crimes.

And, further, as Thucydides says, “when a response comes closest to suffering” it immediately creates blocks the path for those most moved by an easy way with wickedness. For nothing renders the wronged party weaker in his hopes and spirit and increases the criminal’s daring and audacity than a debt paid late. But the immediate punishment meted out to bold acts is both a restraint on futures crimes and a special comfort to those who have suffered from them.”

Καὶ ὁ Πατροκλέας ‘ἡ περὶ τὰς τιμωρίας’ εἶπε ‘τῶν πονηρῶν βραδυτὴς τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ μέλλησις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μάλιστα δεινὸν εἶναι· καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τούτων ὥσπερ πρόσφατος γέγονα τῇ δόξῃ καὶ καινός, ἔκπαλαι δ’ ἠγανάκτουν ἀκούων Εὐριπίδου λέγοντος (Or. 420)

‘μέλλει, τὸ θεῖον δ’ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον φύσει.’

καίτοι πρὸς οὐθὲν ἥκιστα δὲ πρέπει πρὸς τοὺς πονηροὺς ῥᾴθυμον εἶναι τὸν θεόν, οὐ ῥᾳθύμους ὄντας αὐτοὺς οὐδ’ ‘ἀμβολιεργούς’ τοῦ κακῶς ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὀξυτάταις ὁρμαῖς ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν φερομένους πρὸς τὰς ἀδικίας. καὶ μήν ‘τὸ ἀμύνασθαι τῷ παθεῖν,’ ὡς Θουκυδίδης (III 38, 1) φησίν,  ‘ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον’ εὐθὺς ἀντιφράττει τὴν ὁδὸν τοῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον εὐροούσῃ τῇ κακίᾳ χρωμένοις. οὐθὲν γὰρ οὕτω χρέος ὡς τὸ τῆς δίκης ὑπερήμερον γινόμενον ἀσθενῆ μὲν ταῖς ἐλπίσι ποιεῖ καὶ ταπεινὸν τὸν ἀδικούμενον, αὔξει δὲ θρασύτητι καὶ τόλμῃ τὸν μοχθηρόν· αἱ δ’ ὑπὸ χεῖρα τοῖς τολμωμένοις ἀπαντῶσαι τιμωρίαι καὶ τῶν μελλόντων εἰσὶν ἐπισχέσεις ἀδικημάτων καὶ μάλιστα τὸ παρηγοροῦν τοὺς πεπονθότας ἔνεστιν αὐταῖς.

What Good is Philosophy? Learning How to Live and Learning How to Die

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The discipline of philosophy has often been singled out for objections on grounds of utility. My suspicion is that modern economic claims against philosophy are merely just permutations of a timeless sense that philosophy is hard and philosophers are annoying.

Although there are probably countless passages defending philosophy against its attackers, here are a few starts at explaining why everyone needs it.

Plato, Phaedo 67e

“In truth, those who practice philosophy correctly practice dying.”

τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετῶσι

Montaigne offers interpretations of this idea:

“Cicero sayeth that to Philosophize is no other thing than for a man to prepare himself to death: which is the reason that study and contemplation doth in some sort withdraw our soul from us, and severally employ it from the body, which is a kind of apprentisage and resemblance of death. Or else it is that all the wisdom and discourse of the world doth in the end resolve upon this point: to teach us not to fear to die.  Truly either reason mocks us, or it only aimeth at our contentment, and in fine bends all her travel to make us live well and, as the holy Scripture sayeth, at our ease. All the opinions of the world conclude that pleasure is our end, howbeit they take diverse means unto and for it, else would men reject them at their first coming. For who would give ear unto him that for its end would establish our pain and disturbance?”

(Shakespeare’s Montaigne, Greenblatt and Platt 2014: 13) Other translations are available online. But for fun, here’s the French (Also available online from the Montaigne Project).

Plutarch, An Virtus Doceri Possit (“On Whether Virtue Can Be Taught) 439a

“We are deliberating and debating about virtue, whether it, or thinking, acting and living well can be taught. So we are surprised that the accomplishments of speakers, captains, musicians, architects and farmers are countless, while ‘good men’ are merely named and mentioned, like ‘Centaurs’, ‘Giants’, and Cyclopes. It is also not possible to find any achievement that is faultless in respect to virtue, or a character pure of passions or a life untouched by shame. Yet, even if nature does offer anything noble on its own, mustn’t it be obscured by much else, the way wheat is mixed with wild and impure weeds?

Men learn to play strings, to dance, to read, to farm and to ride horses. And why is that strange? They learn to put on shoes and clothes, they learn to pour wine and to cook. These things cannot be done well without learning. But the reason all these things are done—living well—that is unteachable, irrational, artless and by chance?”

Περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς βουλευόμεθα καὶ διαποροῦμεν, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστι τὸ φρονεῖν τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν τὸ εὖ ζῆν· εἶτα θαυμάζομεν, εἰ ῥητόρων μὲν ἔργα καὶ κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἁρμονικῶν καὶ οἰκοδόμων καὶ γεωργῶν μυρί’ ἐστίν, ἀγαθοὶ δ’ ἄνδρες ὀνομάζονται καὶ λέγονται μόνον, ὡς ἱπποκένταυροι καὶ γίγαντες καὶ κύκλωπες, ἔργον δ’ ἀμεμφὲς εἰς ἀρετὴν [καὶ ἀκέραιον] οὐκ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν οὐδὲ πάθους ἀκέραιον ἦθος οὐδ’ ἄθικτον αἰσχροῦ βίον, ἀλλ’ εἰ καί τι καλὸν ἡ φύσις αὐτομάτως ἐκφέρει, τοῦτο πολλῷ τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ, καθάπερ ὕλῃ καρπὸς ἀγρίᾳ καὶ ἀκαθάρτῳ μιγνύμενος, ἐξαμαυροῦται; ψάλλειν μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν γράμματα καὶ γεωργεῖν καὶ ἱππεύειν· καὶ τί δεινόν; ὑποδεῖσθαι μανθάνουσι περιβάλλεσθαι, οἰνοχοεῖν διδάσκουσιν ὀψοποιεῖν· ταῦτ’ ἄνευ τοῦ μαθεῖν οὐκ ἔστι χρησίμως ποιεῖν, δι’ ὃ δὲ  ταῦτα πάντα, τὸ εὖ βιοῦν, ἀδίδακτον καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἄτεχνον καὶ αὐτόματον;

Sententiae Recentiores: “Be a Philosopher…”

“We must always take care that we do not become so devoted to one branch of learning that we neglect the others, nor should we, by applying ourselves too closely to natural science neglect the study of morals or the business of everyday life.”

Semper autem cavendum est, nec, si uni iungamur arti, ut reliquas negligamus, neve naturalibus inhaerentes studiis ac contemplationibus, quae moralia sunt postponamus et rebus abducamur agendis.

-Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, de Liberorum Educatione, chp. 94

This sentiment is echoed in David Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 1:

“Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.”

Of course, sometimes philosophy is just a back-up plan:

Plato Was a Bad Poet, so He Turned to Philosophy: Aelian, Varia Historia 2.30

“Plato, the son of Ariston, at first pursued poetry and used to write heroic verse. But he soon burned it all because he despised it, since he reckoned that his poetry was far inferior when compared to Homer’s. He then tried tragedy and even completed a tetralogy, and he was about to enter the competition, even to the point of giving the verses to actors. But right before the Dionysia, he went and heard Socrates; and once he was seized by that Siren, he not only withdrew from the competition, but he also gave up the writing of tragedy for good to immerse himself in philosophy.”

Πλάτων ὁ ᾿Αρίστωνος τὰ πρῶτα ἐπὶ ποιητικὴν ὥρμησε, καὶ ἡρωϊκὰ ἔγραφε μέτρα• εἶτα αὐτὰ κατέπρησεν ὑπεριδὼν αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ τοῖς ῾Ομήρου αὐτὰ ἀντικρίνων ἑώρα κατὰ πολὺ ἡττώμενα. ἐπέθετο οὖν τραγῳδίᾳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τετραλογίαν εἰργάσατο, καὶ ἔμελλεν ἀγωνιεῖσθαι, δοὺς ἤδη τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς τὰ ποιήματα. πρὸ τῶν Διονυσίων δὲ παρελθὼν ἤκουσε Σωκράτους, καὶ ἅπαξ αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου σειρῆνος, τοῦ ἀγωνίσματος οὐ μόνον ἀπέστη τότε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελέως τὸ γράφειν τραγῳδίαν ἀπέρριψε, καὶ ἀπεδύσατο ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν.

Caesar Threatens Metellus: Plutarch, Caesar 35

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“When Metellus and some of his partisans stood in Caesar’s way, Caesar held out and threatened to kill him, if he did not stand down. He added, ‘And you know, boy, that it is harder for me to say that than to do it.'”

αὖθις δ’ ἐνισταμένου τοῦ Μετέλλου καί τινων ἐπαινούντων, διατεινάμενος ἠπείλησεν ἀποκτενεῖν αὐτόν, εἰ μὴ παύσαιτο παρενοχλῶν· „καὶ τοῦτ’” ἔφη „μειράκιον οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι μοι δυσκολώτερον  ἦν εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι.”

Caesar Must be First: Plutarch, Caesar 11 (ft. Suetonius!)

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“It is said that when he crossed the Alps and came to a little barbarian town, inhabited by a very few people and indeed, a sad little place, his comrades asked with a bit of laughter and jesting, ‘Do they have the same craving for honors there, the same struggles for primacy and the same enmity between their foremost men?’ Caesar responded with considerably seriousness, ‘I would rather be the first man among those barbarians than second among the Romans.’”

λέγεται δὲ τὰς ῎Αλπεις ὑπερβάλλοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ πολίχνιόν τι βαρβαρικόν, οἰκούμενον ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων παντάπασιν ὀλίγων καὶ λυπρόν, παρερχομένου, τοὺς ἑταίρους ἅμα γέλωτι καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς „ἦ που” φάναι „κἀνταῦθά τινές εἰσιν ὑπὲρ ἀρχῶν φιλοτιμίαι καὶ περὶπρωτείων ἅμιλλαι καὶ φθόνοι τῶν δυνατῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους;” τὸν δὲ Καίσαρα σπουδάσαντα πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν· „ἐγὼ μὲν <μᾶλλον ἂν> ἐβουλόμην παρὰ τούτοις εἶναι [μᾶλλον] πρῶτος ἢ παρὰ ῾Ρωμαίοις δεύτερος.”

 

This is reminiscent of a passage in Suetonius (Divus Iulius, 29), in which he relates that Caesar would not readily settle for being second place:

“Caesar was disturbed by these things and because he judged (and they say that people often heard this from him) that it would be more difficult to force him from first place to second than second to last, he resisted with all his power…”

Commotus his Caesar ac iudicans, quod saepe ex eo auditum ferunt, difficilius se principem civitatis a primo ordine in secundum quam ex secundo in novissimum detrudi, summa ope restitit…

Sneezing Your Way Toward Virtue: Socrates’ Divine Inspiration

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Plutarch’s De Genio Socratis (“On the Sign of Socrates”) differs from much of the work lumped together in his Moralia in that (1) it is a dialogue not a treatise and (2) it is historical, set around 379 BCE. In it, a group debates events around the rise of Theban hegemony; but they also argue about whether or not Socrates had special communiques from the gods.

“My father interrupted and said ‘Galaxidoros, I myself have heard instead from a certain Megarian, who heard it from Terpsion, that Socrates’ divine sign was a sneeze, either his own or one from others. So, when someone sneezed on his right side, whether in front of him or behind him, he went to action there; if on the left, he turned away.  One of his own sneezes was a confirmation either to continue what he was about to do or to stop if it happened after he had begun.

But it seems surprising that Socrates would use a sneeze as such a sign and yet he used to tell his friends that it was a divine signal that hindered or encouraged him, and not that. This, my friend, is some kind of empty and meaningless claim, not one of truth and simplicity which we might credit as true in a great man who differed from so many, that he might be so dumfounded by a voice from without or some sneeze that he would refrain from action and give up something he had planned.’ ”

ὑπολαβὼν δ’ ὁ πατήρ ‘ἀλλὰ μήν’ ἔφη ‘καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Γαλαξίδωρε, Μεγαρικοῦ τινος ἤκουσα, Τερψίωνος δὲ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι τὸ Σωκράτους δαιμόνιον πταρμὸς ἦν, ὅ τε παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ παρ’ ἄλλων. ἑτέρου μὲν γὰρ πταρόντος ἐκ δεξιᾶς εἴτ’ ὄπισθεν εἴτ’ ἔμπροσθεν ὁρμᾶν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν, εἰ δ’ ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς, ἀποτρέπεσθαι· τῶν δ’ αὐτοῦ πταρμῶν τὸν μὲν ἔτι μέλλοντος βεβαιοῦν τὸν δ’ ἤδη πράσσοντος ἐπέχειν καὶ κωλύειν τὴν ὁρμήν. ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνό μοι δοκεῖ θαυμαστόν, εἰ πταρμῷ χρώμενος οὐ τοῦτο τοῖς ἑταίροις ἀλλὰ δαιμόνιον εἶναι τὸ κωλῦον ἢ κελεῦον ἔλεγε· τύφου γὰρ ἂν ἦν τινος, ὦ φίλε, κενοῦ καὶ κόμπου τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἀληθείας καὶ ἁπλότητος οἷς τὸν ἄνδρα μέγαν ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν πολλῶν γεγονέναι δοκοῦμεν, ὑπὸ φωνῆς ἔξωθεν ἢ πταρμοῦ τινος ὁπηνίκα τύχοι θορυβούμενον ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ἀνατρέπεσθαι καὶ προΐεσθαι τὸ δεδογμένον.

A Quip, The Sense of a Man; A Sip, The Character of a Wine: Philostratus on Anecdotes

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Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, 537

“This is another wonderful saying of that Lucius:

The Emperor Marcus [Aurelius] was excited about the philosopher Sextus from Boeotia, appearing at his lectures and visiting his home. Lucius, who had recently arrived in Rome, asked the emperor as he approached where he was going and why and Marcus responded “Learning is good, even for a man growing old. I am going to learn what I do not yet know from Sextus the Philosopher.” Then Lucius raised his hand to the sky and said “Zeus! The aging Emperor of Rome dons a writing tablet and goes to school, but my king Alexander died at thirty-two!”

These sayings suffice to show the character of the work Lucius performed in his philosophy. Such anecdotes, I suppose, give a sense of the man the way a taste betrays the character of a wine.”

Λουκίου τούτου κἀκεῖνο θαυμάσιον·

ἐσπούδαζε μὲν ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ Μάρκος περὶ Σέξτον τὸν ἐκ Βοιωτίας φιλόσοφον, θαμίζων αὐτῷ καὶ φοιτῶν ἐπὶ θύρας, ἄρτι δὲ ἥκων ἐς τὴν ῾Ρώμην ὁ Λούκιος ἤρετο τὸν αὐτοκράτορα προιόντα, ποῖ βαδίζοι καὶ ἐφ’ ὅ τι, καὶ ὁ Μάρκος „καλὸν” ἔφη „καὶ γηράσκοντι τὸ μανθάνειν· εἶμι δὴ πρὸς Σέξτον τὸν φιλόσοφον μαθησόμενος, ἃ οὔπω οἶδα.” καὶ ὁ Λούκιος ἐξάρας τὴν χεῖρα ἐς τὸν οὐρανὸν „ὦ Ζεῦ,” ἔφη „ὁ ῾Ρωμαίων βασιλεὺς γηράσκων ἤδη δέλτον ἐξαψάμενος ἐς διδασκάλου φοιτᾷ, ὁ δὲ ἐμὸς βασιλεὺς ᾿Αλέξανδρος δύο καὶ τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἀπέθανεν.” ἀπόχρη καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα δεῖξαι τὴν ἰδέαν, ἣν ἐφιλοσόφει Λούκιος, ἱκανὰ γάρ που ταῦτα δηλῶσαι τὸν ἄνδρα, καθάπερ τὸν ἀνθοσμίαν τὸ γεῦμα.

The sentiment in the final line is similar to the more famous assertion of Plutarch in the Life of Alexander (1.2-3)

“A brief deed or comment or even some joke often shows the imprint of a man’s character more than battles of a thousand corpses, the greatest campaigns or sieges of cities.”

ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα βραχὺ πολλάκις καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ παιδιά τις ἔμφασιν ἤθους ἐποίησε μᾶλλον ἢ μάχαι μυριόνεκροι καὶ παρατάξεις αἱ μέγισται καὶ πολιορκίαι πόλεων.

The full text.

Plutarch.

Not Learning How to Read Poetry Can Corrupt You

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In his “How a Young Man Ought to Listen to Poetry” (Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat; Moralia 14d-37b), Plutarch seems to take on earlier (read: Platonic) injunctions about the dangers posed by imitation.  Here, Plutarch suggests that it is equally perilous not to learn how to read properly:

“A young man should not be in the habit of praising any of these things [e.g. poetry that presents sacrilegious comments about the gods or instances of immortal behavior] nor should he practice offering excuses or be persuasive and persistent in devising certain conspicuous prevarications for improper actions. Instead, let him believe that poetry is the imitation of characters and lives of men who are not perfect nor holy not unimpeachable in all ways—in short of men who are afflicted by suffering, false beliefs and ignorance, but who, thanks to their innate nobility, may often change themselves for the better. This sort of training and perspective for a youth, one which makes him attuned to and excited at things done or said as well as resistant, even intolerant, of base deeds, will not visit harm upon audiences.

But a man who is amazed at everything, one who adapts himself to everything, because of some popular judgment is enchanted by the names of heroes, just like those men who imitate Plato’s bad posture or Aristotle’s lisp. Such a man is predisposed to much that is corrupting without knowing it.”

μηδὲν οὖν ἐπαινεῖν ἐθιζέσθω τοιοῦτον ὁ νέος, μηδὲ προφάσεις λέγων μηδὲ παραγωγάς τινας εὐπρεπεῖς ἐπὶ πράγμασι φαύλοις μηχανώμενος πιθανὸς ἔστω καὶ πανοῦργος, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον οἰέσθω, μίμησιν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν ἠθῶν καὶ βίων, καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὐ τελείων οὐδὲ καθαρῶν οὐδ’ ἀνεπιλήπτων παντάπασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένων πάθεσι καὶ δόξαις ψευδέσι καὶ ἀγνοίαις, διὰ δ’ εὐφυΐαν αὑτοὺς πολλάκις μετατιθέντων πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον. ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη παρασκευὴ τοῦ νέου καὶ διάνοια, τοῖς μὲν εὖ λεγομένοις καὶ πραττομένοις ἐπαιρομένου καὶ συνενθουσιῶντος, τὰ δὲ φαῦλα μὴ προσιεμένου καὶ δυσχεραίνοντος, ἀβλαβῆ παρέξει τὴν ἀκρόασιν. ὁ δὲ πάντα θαυμάζων καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξοικειούμενος καὶ καταδεδουλωμένος τῇ δόξῃ τὴν κρίσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡρωϊκῶν ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ οἱ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀπομιμούμενοι κυρτότητα καὶ τὴν ᾿Αριστοτέλους τραυλότητα, λήσεται πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν φαύλων εὐχερὴς γενόμενος.

Wine Tours and Drinking Fragments

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Today we have arranged for a full-day of babysitting for the children. We will be touring texas vineyards and honoring Autumn by harvesting the fruit of the vine. Ok, drinking too much.

The only catch? The tour is with a large group of members of my wife’s profession (she’s a dentist).

So I have collected some lines to carry with me through the day.

Sophocles, Fr. 735 (Athenaeus, Deipnosophists 10, 428 A)

 

“Drinking under compulsion is an evil equal to thirst”

τὸ πρὸς βίαν / πίνειν ἴσον πέφυκε τῷ διψῆν κακόν

Theognis 627-628

“It is shameful when a man is drunk among the sober
and it is shameful if man remains sober among drunks.”

Αἰσχρόν τοι μεθύοντα παρ’ ἀνδράσι νήφοσιν εἶναι,
αἰσχρὸν δ’ εἰ νήφων πὰρ μεθύουσι μένει

Carm. Conv. 17

“I wish I could turn into an ivory lyre
And that beautiful children would carry me to the Dionysian dance.”

εἴθε λύρα καλὴ γενοίμην ἐλεφαντίνη
καί με καλοὶ παῖδες φέροιεν Διονύσιον ἐς χορόν.

Carm. Conv. 6

“What kind of man each person is
I wish I could know by opening his chest and then
Looking at his mind and after closing it again
To recognize a dear friend by his guileless thought”

εἴθ’ ἐξῆν ὁποῖός τις ἦν ἕκαστος
τὸ στῆθος διελόντ’, ἔπειτα τὸν νοῦν
ἐσιδόντα, κλείσαντα πάλιν,
ἄνδρα φίλον νομίζειν ἀδόλωι φρενί.

Anonymous Lyrics (Plutarch, Table Talk 1)

“I hate the drinking buddy who doesn’t forget.”

μισέω μνάμονα συμπόταν

Cratinus, fr. 199

“Wine is like a swift horse for a charming poet; you won’t produce anything clever if you’re drinking water.”

οἶνός τοι χαρίεντι πέλει ταχὺς ἵππος ἀοιδῷ,
ὕδωρ δὲ πίνων οὐδὲν ἂν τέκοι σοφόν.

Carm. Conv. 890

“The best thing for a mortal man is to be healthy
And second, to be pretty.
Third, is to be wealthy without deceit.
And, fourth, is to be young with friends.”

ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνητῷ,
δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι,
τὸ δὲ τρίτον πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
τέταρτον δὲ ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

Xenophon, Oeconomicus 11.3-12.1

“First, Socrates, you can’t make lushes pay attention: drinking makes them heedless of everything that needs doing.”

Πρῶτον μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς οἴνου ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ ἂν δύναιο ἐπιμελεῖς ποιῆσαι· τὸ γὰρ μεθύειν λήθην ἐμποιεῖ πάντων τῶν πράττειν δεομένων.

If Politicians Ever Agreed, They Might Actually Do Some Harm (Plutarch, Moralia)

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Plutarch, Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat 20 C

“Philosophers, at least, when they want to correct behavior and teach, use examples from real events. But poets do the same thing by making up facts and telling myths! Melanthios, thus, either joking or in earnest, used to say that the city of Athens was saved by the strife and disruption of its politicians, since they would not all gather on one side of the ship. In this way, thanks to the disagreement of the politicians, there was always a counterweight to actual harm. Similarly, the contradictions of the poets do not allow a forceful tipping into harm by bringing restoring our credulity to balance.”

οἱ γοῦν φιλόσοφοι παραδείγμασι χρῶνται, νουθετοῦντες καὶ παιδεύοντες ἐξ ὑποκειμένων· οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ ταὐτὰ ποιοῦσι πλάττοντες αὐτοὶ πράγματα καὶ μυθολογοῦντες. ὁ μὲν οὖν Μελάνθιος εἴτε παίζων εἴτε σπουδάζων ἔλεγε διασῴζεσθαι τὴν ᾿Αθηναίων πόλιν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων διχοστασίας καὶ ταραχῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀποκλίνειν ἅπαντας εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖχον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαί τινα τοῦ  βλάπτοντος ἀνθολκὴν ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν πολιτευομένων. αἱ δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν ὑπεναντιώσεις πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἀνταναφέρουσαι τὴν πίστιν οὐκ ἐῶσιν ἰσχυρὰν ῥοπὴν γενέσθαι πρὸς τὸ βλάπτον.