The Athenian democracy had a fraught history that included sometimes attractive ideas like ostracism and frighteningly volatile features that led them to vote for the destruction of Mytilene one day only to rescind the order the next. One of their founding narratives also included the near-beatification of the killers of the tyrant Hipparchus, Harmodios and Aristogeitôn.
The following poems are taken from traditions of drinking songs in their honor.
PMG 893-897
“I will wrap my sword in a crown of myrtle
As Harmodius and Aristogeiton did
When they killed the tyrant
And made the Athenians equal under the law.”
“Dearest Harmodius, you have never died,
But they say you live in the isles of the blest
Where swift-footed Achilles
And Tydeus’ fine son Diomedes are”
“I will wrap my sword with a branch of myrtle,
Just as Harmodius and Aristogeiton did
When at the Athenian sacrifices
They killed the tyrant, a man named Hipparchus”
“Fame will always be yours in this land,
Dearest Harmodios and Aristogeiton,
Because you killed the tyrant
And made the Athenians equal under the law.”
“Whoever wants to find a perjurer should go to the public assembly”
qui periurum conuenire uolt hominem ito in comitium
Cicero, De legibus II.22
“For perjury the divine punishment is destruction, the human punishment is shame”
Periurii poena divina exitium, humana dedecus.
Lucan 4.218-226
“Must we beg Caesar to handle us no worse than
His other slaves? Have your generals’ lives been begged?
Our safety will never be the price and bribe for foul treason.
This is not a civil war they fight for us to live.
We are dragged this way under the claims of peace.
People would not search for iron in a deep mine,
They would not strengthen any city with walls,
No fierce steed would rush to war,
No sea would bear towered ships of the fleet,
If it were ever just to trade freedom for peace.”
Utque habeat famulos nullo discrimine Caesar,
Exorandus erit? ducibus quoque vita petita est?
Numquam nostra salus pretium mercesque nefandae
Proditionis erit; non hoc civilia bella,
Ut vivamus, agunt. Trahimur sub nomine pacis.
Non chalybem gentes penitus fugiente metallo
Eruerent, nulli vallarent oppida muri,
Non sonipes in bella ferox, non iret in aequor
Turrigeras classis pelago sparsura carinas
Si bene libertas umquam pro pace daretur
From the Twelve Tables
“The Law of the Twelve Tables commands that anyone who has conspired with an enemy against the state or handed a citizen to a public enemy, should suffer capital punishment.”
Marcianus, ap. Dig., XLVIII, 4, 3: Lex XII Tabularum iubet eum qui hostem concitaverit quive civem hosti tradiderit capite puniri.
Tacitus Histories 3. 57
“How much power the audacity of single individuals can have during civil discord! Claudius Flaventinus, a centurion dismissed by Galba in shame, made the fleet at Misenum revolt with forged letters from Vespasian promising a reward for treason. Claudius Apollinaris, a man neither exceptional for his loyalty nor dedicated in his betrayal, was in charge of the fleet; and Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor who was by chance at Minturnae then, put himself forth as the leader of the defectors.”
Sed classem Misenensem (tantum civilibus discordiis etiam singulorum audacia valet) Claudius Faventinus centurio per ignominiam a Galba dimissus ad defectionem traxit, fictis Vespasiani epistulis pretium proditionis ostentans. Praeerat classi Claudius Apollinaris, neque fidei constans neque strenuus in perfidia; et Apinius Tiro praetura functus ac tum forte Minturnis agens ducem se defectoribus obtulit.
“Dêmadês: He was king in Thebes after Antipater. A son of Dêmeas the sailor, he was also a sailor, a shipbuilder, and a ferry-operator. He gave up these occupations to enter politics and turned out to be a traitor—he grew very wealthy from this and obtained, as a bribe from Philip, property in Boiotia.”
[Elektra] Did he not speak for you, eager that you not die,
Menelaos the coward, our father’s traitor?
[Orestes] He didn’t show his face, because he yearning
For the scepter—he was careful not to save his relatives
“Don’t you understand that while, in other cases, it is necessary to impose a penalty on those who have committed crimes after examining the matter precisely and uncovering the truth over time, but for instances of clear and agreed-upon treason, we must yield first to anger and what comes from it? Don’t you think that this man would betray any of the things most crucial to the state, once you made him in charge of it?”
“It is right that punishments for other crimes come after them, but punishment for treason should precede the dissolution of the state. If you miss that opportune moment when those men are about to do something treacherous against their state, it is not possible for you to obtain justice from the men who did wrong: for they become stronger than the punishment possible from those who have been wronged.”
“Oath runs right alongside crooked judgments.
But a roar comes from Justice as she is dragged where
bribe-devouring men lead when they apply laws with crooked judgments.
She attends the city and the haunts of the hosts
weeping and cloaked in mist, bringing evil to people
who drive her out and do not practice righteous law.
For those who give fair judgments to foreigners and citizens
and who do not transgress the law in any way,
cities grow strong, and the people flourish within them;
A child-nourishing peace settles on the land, and never
Does wide-browed Zeus sound the sign of harsh war.”
Justice is a maiden who was born from Zeus.
The gods who live on Olympus honor her
and whenever someone wrongs her by bearing false witness
she sits straightaway at the feet of Zeus, Kronos’ son
and tells him the plans of unjust men so that the people
will pay the price of the wickedness of kings who make murderous plans
and twist her truth by proclaiming false judgments.
Keep these things in mind, bribe-swallowing kings:
whoever wrongs another also wrongs himself;
an evil plan is most evil for the one who makes it.
The eye of Zeus sees everything and knows everything
and even now, if he wishes, will look on us and not miss
what kind of justice the walls of our city protects.
Today, I wouldn’t wish myself to be just among unjust people
nor my child, since it bad to be a just person
If anyone who is more unjust has greater rights.
But I hope that Zeus, the counselor, will not let this happen.”
“What a pitiful overthrow of the state–so fast and twisted, so rushed! Who will have the ability to entrust these events to words in a way that they seem facts instead of fiction? Who will have the ease of mind to read them as something other than fantastic, even when they have been faithfully recorded in time?”
o miseram et in brevi tam celerem et tam variam rei publicae commutationem! quisnam tali futurus ingenio est, qui possit haec ita mandare litteris ut facta, non ficta videantur [esse]? quis erit tanta animi facilitate qui quae verissime memoria propagata fuerint non fabulae similia sit existimaturus?
A Pensioner of the Revolution, by John Neagle, The American Revolution Institute collection Note: The portrait depicts Joseph Winter, a homeless veteran living on the street in Philadelphia.
“Act in every way as if Epicurus were watching you.” It is certainly an advantage to get yourself a minder to consult, someone you consider an overseer for your thoughts. It is far better to live as if some noble man were always in your sight, but I am happy if you do what you do as if anyone else is watching–isolation commends every kind of evil to us.
When you have advanced so far that you are also embarrassed in front of yourself, then you can dismiss your witness. In the meantime, choose some other authority as a guardian for yourself, a Cato or Scipio or Laelius or any person whose presence would curb the offenses of even the worst kind of wastrel. Do this as long as it takes to make yourself the kind of person in whose presence you wouldn’t dare to sin.
When you have accomplished this and you begin to have real self-respect, I will start to let you do what Epicurus advises in another passage: “The best time to retreat within yourself is when you are compelled to be in a crowd.”
“Sic fac,” inquit, “omnia, tamquam spectet Epicurus.” Prodest sine dubio custodem sibi inposuisse et habere, quem respicias, quem interesse cogitationibus tuis iudices. Hoc quidem longe magnificentius est, sic vivere tamquam sub alicuius boni viri ac semper praesentis oculis, sed ego etiam hoc contentus sum, ut sic facias, quaecumque facies, tamquam spectet aliquis; omnia nobis mala solitudo persuadet. Cum iam profeceris tantum, ut sit tibi etiam tui reverentia, licebit dimittas paedagogum; interim aliquorum te auctoritate custodi, aut Cato ille sit aut Scipio aut Laelius aut talis, cuius1 interventu perditi quoque homines vitia supprimerent, dum te efficis eum, cum quo peccare non audeas. Cum hoc effeceris, et aliqua coeperit apud te tui esse dignatio, incipiam tibi permittere, quod idem suadet Epicurus: “Tunc praecipue in te ipse secede, cum esse cogeris in turba.”
Diogenes Laertius 10.2
“Apollodorus the Epicurian writes in his first book of On the Life of Epicurus that the philosopher turned to the study of philosophy when he noted that his teachers could not explain to him the meaning of Chaos in Hesiod.”
“I cannot conceive what the good is if I separate it from the pleasures of taste, from the pleasures of sex, from the pleasures of sound, or those of beautiful bodies.”
“Whoever understands the limits of life knows that it is extremely easy to take away the pain of want and to make all of life fulfilled. Then he lacks nothing which is acquired through conflicts.”
“Epicurus denies there are two competing motives at war with one another. That’s not because he wants to convince you that action done from duty is actually pleasant, like you’re foolishly overlooking the joy of dutifully mowing the lawn or changing diapers. It’s the Stoics who encourage finding joy in acting from duty. The Epicureans deny that we act from duty at all.”
-Emily A. Austin, 31
More from Diogenes Laertius
“Some of our desires are natural and necessary. Others are natural and not necessary. Some more are neither natural nor necessary, but they develop thanks to meaningless beliefs.”
“A subject remains which is especially important to this debate, that is friendship which, as you believe, will completely disappear if pleasure is the greatest good. Concerning friendship, Epicurus himself says that of all the paths to happiness wisdom has prepared, there is none greater, more productive, or more enchanting than this one. And he did not advocate for friendship in speech alone but much more through his life, his deeds and his customs.
Myths of the ancients illustrate how great friendship is—in those tales however varied and numerous you seek from the deepest part of antiquity and you will find scarcely three pairs of friends, starting with Theseus and up to Orestes. But, Epicurus in one single and quite small home kept so great a crowd of friends united by the depth of their love. And this is still the practice among Epicureans.”
XX Restat locus huic disputationi vel maxime necessarius, de amicitia, quam si voluptas summum sit bonum affirmatis nullam omnino fore; de qua Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum quas ad beate vivendum sapientia comparaverit nihil esse maius amicitia, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius. Nec vero hoc oratione solum sed multo magis vita et factis et moribus comprobavit. Quod quam magnum sit fictae veterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tam multis tamque variis, ab ultima antiquitate repetitis, tria vix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem pervenias profectus a Theseo. At vero Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientes tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis.
When I was in graduate school there was an event on Iliad 1 sponsored by Ancient Studies at NYU. There was a performance of the Aquila Theatre Company followed by a discussion among David Sider (my advisor), Peter Meineck, and Daniel Mendelsohn. I can’t remember who was moderating, but someone asked the very broad question “what is the Iliad about”. Peter, the founding director of Aquila at a veteran of the Royal Marines, said, “war”. David, looking off into the distance for a bit, said, “it is about how you value a man.” And then we were off!
I’ve told this story in different forms before because it was one of the first times where I was listening to other people talk about Homer and found myself wondering what it means for everyone to have a good point, for everyone to be right, but to also be wrong. As I have mentioned before, the Iliad is in part successful because it defies simple interpretation, invites multiple responses, and shifts the more we engage with it. That panel was one of the first times where I stopped thinking about what the Iliad means and worried more about what epic does.
Of course, modern social media is not the place necessarily fit for such a conversation! From the social media app that brought us “If we don’t teach Homer, nobody will act like Odysseus”, yesterday the world was treated to: Celebrate the Rage of Achilles!
Now, one could argue that a meaning of “celebrate” is to make known. The Iliad certainly has ensured that Achilles’ rage is pretty well-known, but not for reasons Mr. Bi would probably agree with. Achilles’ rage, as nearly every post in this substack has alluded to or mentioned, is the story of the dangers of rage, of the selfishness of Achilles, of the destruction that a man’s anger, honor, and strife can mete out upon his own community.
But, since menis is in the air. Here’s a recap.
As I discussed in an earlier post the beginning of the Iliad contains thematically resonant language that engages with the larger poetic tradition while also informing audiences what to expect from this poem:
“Goddess, sing the rage of Pelias’ son Achilles, Destructive, how it gave the Achaeans endless pains And sent many brave souls of heroes to Hades— And it made them food for the dogs And all the birds as Zeus’ plan was being fulfilled. Start from when those two first diverged in strife, The lord of men Atreus’ son and godly Achilles.”
The “rage” of the the first line has a few different functions: (1) it ‘titles’ the poem (the rage of Achilles is a narrative set in the story-world of the Trojan War); and (2) it recalls/invokes a narrative pattern. Rage isn’t about anger itself but about what anger does in the world.
Even in the Iliad, Achilles rages for different reasons: first at Agamemnon, then at Hektor for the death of Patroklos. For me, the most influential account of Achilles’ rage is my Greek teacher’s book The Anger of Achilles: Menis in Greek Epic, which explains in part that Menis signals a rage reserved for divine figures over cosmic disorder. (For a complementary treatment of different words for Anger in the Homeric poems, see Thomas Walsh’s Fighting Words and Feuding Words: Anger and the Homeric Poems.) Two recent and important books should be read as supplements for this. Emily Austin’s Grief and the Hero explores how longing, absence, and grief are critical corollaries for rage, while Rachel Lesser’s Desire in the Iliad details how desire pervades the fabric of epic poetry and motivates its characters.
Ancient commentators were interested in the problem as well that echo the titling and pattern functions I mention above:
D Schol. ad Hom. Il 1.1
“Sing the rage..” [People] ask why the poem begins from rage, so ill-famed a word. It does for two reasons. First, so that it might [grab the attention] of that particular portion of the soul and make audiences more ready for the sublime and position us to handle sufferings nobly, since it is about to narrate wars.
A second reason is to make the praises of the Greeks more credible. Since it was about to reveal the Greeks prevailing, it is not seemly to make it more worthy of credibility by failing to make everything contribute positively to their praise.”
“It begins with rage, which itself was a summary for the events. Otherwise, [the poet] would have found a tragic introduction for tragedies. For the narration of misfortunes makes us more attentive, just as the best doctor exposes maladies of the spirit and then later applies treatment. So, the Greek anticipates the pleasures near the end.”
But just to be clear, the story that unfolds in ourIliad wasn’t the only pattern that could have been expected (or, is not the only way to frame or emphasize the theme). Another beginning to the story fronts Apollo’s range alongside Achilles’.
D Scholia ad Hom. Il. Prolegomenon in Rom. Bibl. Nat gr. 6:
“An Iliad which appears to be ancient, called Apellicon’s, has this proem
I sing of the Muses and Apollo, known for his bow…
This is recorded by Nikanôr and Crates in his Critical Notes on the Text of the Iliad. Aristoxenus in the first book of his Praxidamanteia says that some had as the first lines:
Tell me now Muses who have Olympian Homes
How rage and anger overtook Peleus’ son
And also the shining son of Leto. For the king was enraged…”
When it comes to these lines, the question is whether they derive from a performance tradition of the story of the rage of Achilles as more or less equally likely options to begin the epic poem we currently have, or they are variants left over from traditions of other Iliads. I am generally agnostic and think that the scholars I have mentioned above all have really good arguments.
I do note here that when I use the word multiform as opposed to variant I (think) I mean a more-or-less equally possible option from the performance tradition. When I use ‘variant’, I mostly mean a less-likely or aesthetically apt alternative (because variant implies a movement from something standard or already extant). But Casey Dué’s (free!) book Achilles Unboundis far more nuanced and informative in discussing these things. I also suggest José M. González’s The Epic Rhapsode and His Craft: Homeric Performance in a Diachronic Perspective
Some additional work to consider
Austin, Norman J. E.. “Anger and disease in Homer’s Iliad.” Euphrosyne: studies in ancient epic and its legacy in honor of Dimitris N. Maronitis. Eds. Kazazis, John N. and Rengakos, Antonios. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999. 11-49.
Cagnazzo, Daniela Immacolata. “L’ira di Achille nei « Mirmidoni » di Eschilo.” Il teatro delle emozioni: l’ira : atti del 3° Convegno Internazionale di Studi (Padova, 12-14 ottobre 2020, online). Eds. De Poli, Mattia and Riu, Xavier. Colloquia; 14. Padova: Padova University Press, 2020. 173-191.
Cairns, Douglas L.. “Ethics, ethology, terminology: Iliadic anger and the cross-cultural study of emotion.” Yale Classical Studies, vol. 32, 2003, pp. 11-49.
Castellani, Victor. “Little Ajax, Odysseus, and divine « wraths ».” The Classical Bulletin, vol. 81, no. 2, 2005, pp. 107-130.
Collins, Leslie. “The wrath of Paris. Ethical vocabulary and ethical type in the Iliad.” American Journal of Philology, vol. CVIII, 1987, pp. 220-232.
Considine, Patrick. “Some Homeric terms for anger.” Acta Classica, vol. IX, 1966, pp. 15-25.
Cramer, David. “The wrath of Aeneas: Iliad 13.455-67 and 20.75-352.” Syllecta classica, vol. 11, 2000, pp. 16-33.
Ebbott, Mary. “The wrath of Helen: self-blame and nemesis in the « Iliad ».” Plato’s « Laws » and its historical significance: selected papers of the I International Congress on Ancient Thought, Salamanca, 1998. Ed. Lisi, Francisco Leonardo. Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2001. 3-20.
Fenno, Jonathan Brian. “The wrath and vengeance of swift-footed Aeneas in Iliad 13.” Phoenix, vol. 62, no. 1-2, 2008, pp. 145-161.
Grossardt, Peter. “The motif of wrath and withdrawal in medieval European epic and its impact on the Homeric Question: some preliminary remarks.” Classica, vol. 32, no. 1, 2019, pp. 97-129. Doi: 10.24277/classica.v32i1; 10.24277/classica.v32i1.835
Haft, Adele J.. “Odysseus’ wrath and grief in the Iliad. Agamemnon, the Ithacan king, and the sack of Troy in Books 2, 4, and 14.” The Classical Journal, vol. LXXXV, 1989-1990, pp. 97-114.
Horn, Fabian. “The psychology of aggression: Achilles’ wrath and Hector’s flight in Iliad 22.131-7.” Hermes, vol. 146, no. 3, 2018, pp. 277-289. Doi: 10.25162/hermes-2018-0023
Kahane, Ahuvia. “A narratology of the emotions : method, temporality, and anger in Homer’s « Iliad ».” Emotions and narrative in ancient literature and beyond: studies in honour of Irene de Jong. Eds. De Bakker, Mathieu, Van den Berg, Baukje and Klooster, Jacqueline. Mnemosyne. Supplements; 451. Leiden ; Boston (Mass.): Brill, 2022. 27-47. Doi: 10.1163/9789004506053_003
Konstan, David. “Assuaging rage: remorse, repentance, and forgiveness in the classical world.” Ancient forgiveness: classical, Judaic, and Christian. Eds. Griswold, Charles L. and Konstan, David. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2012. 17-30.
Lang, Mabel L.. “War story into wrath story.” The ages of Homer: a tribute to Emily Townsend Vermeule. Eds. Carter, Jane P. and Morris, Sarah P.. Austin (Tex.): University of Texas Pr., 1995. 149-162.
Lidov, Joel B. (1977). The anger of Poseidon. Arethusa, X, 227-236.
Lloyd-Jones, Hugh. “Curses and divine anger in early Greek epic: the Pisander scholion.” Classical Quarterly, N. S., vol. 52, no. 1, 2002, pp. 1-14. Doi: 10.1093/cq/52.1.1
Lutz, Mark J.. “Wrath and justice in Homer’s Achilles.” Interpretation, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005-2006, pp. 111-131.
Van der Mije, Sebastiaan. “Poseidon’s anger in the « Odyssey ».” Emotions and narrative in ancient literature and beyond: studies in honour of Irene de Jong. Eds. De Bakker, Mathieu, Van den Berg, Baukje and Klooster, Jacqueline. Mnemosyne. Supplements; 451. Leiden ; Boston (Mass.): Brill, 2022. 107-118. Doi: 10.1163/9789004506053_008
Most, Glenn W.. “Anger and pity in Homer’s « Iliad ».” Yale Classical Studies, vol. 32, 2003, pp. 50-75.
Rabel, Robert J.. “Apollo as a model for Achilles in the Iliad.” American Journal of Philology, vol. CXI, 1990, pp. 429-440.
Roisman, Hanna M.. “Penelope’s indignation.” TAPA, vol. CXVII, 1987, pp. 59-68.
Saxonhouse, Arlene W.. “Thymos, justice, and moderation of anger in the story of Achilles.” Understanding the political spirit : philosophical investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche. Ed. Zuckert, Catherine H.. New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Pr., 1988. 30-47.
Scodel, Ruth. “The word of Achilles.” Classical Philology, vol. LXXXIV, 1989, pp. 91-99.
Scully, Stephen P.. “Reading the shield of Achilles: terror, anger, delight.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 101, 2003, pp. 29-47.
Shapiro, Harvey Alan. “The wrath of Creon: withholding burial in Homer and Sophocles.” Helios, vol. 33 Supplement, 2006, pp. 119-134.
Slatkin, Laura M.. “The wrath of Thetis.” TAPA, vol. CXVI, 1986, pp. 1-24.
Strauss Clay, Jenny. The wrath of Athena. Gods and men in the Odyssey. Princeton: Princeton University Pr., 1983.
Thalmann, William G.. “« Anger sweeter than dripping honey »: violence as a problem in the « Iliad ».” Ramus, vol. 44, no. 1-2, 2015, pp. 95-114. Doi: 10.1017/rmu.2015.5
Tsagkarakis, Odysseas. “The Achaean embassy and the wrath of Achilles.” Hermes, vol. XCIX, 1971, pp. 257-277.
Zekas, Christodoulos. “From wrath to punishment: indirect communication between Poseidon and Zeus in Homer’s Odyssey 13.125-158.” Trends in Classics, vol. 12, no. 1, 2020, pp. 69-91. Doi: 10.1515/tc-2020-0005
“But Plato in the first and second book of Laws did not—as was opined by a fool—praise that most shameful drunkenness which weakens and diminishes people’s minds; but he did not dismiss that kinder and a bit friendlier embrace of wine which may come under the influence of good judges and masters of banquets. For he believed that minds were renewed by proper and moderate refreshments for the purpose of carrying out the duties of sobriety and, further, that people were bit by bit made happier and rendered better prepared for pursuing their plans again.
At the same time, if there are any deep mistakes of desire or affection with in them which a proper sense of shame usually concealed, than these could all be revealed without serious danger and in this be made readier for alteration and treatment.”
Sed enim Plato in primo et secundo De Legibus non, ut ille nebulo opinabatur, ebrietatem istam turpissimam quae labefacere et inminuere hominum mentes solet laudavit, sed hanc largiorem paulo iucundioremque vini invitationem, quae fieret sub quibusdam quasi arbitris et magistris conviviorum sobriis, non inprobavit. Nam et modicis honestisque inter bibendum remissionibus refici integrarique animos ad instauranda sobrietatis officia existumavit reddique eos sensim laetiores atque ad intentiones rursum capiendas fieri habiliores, et simul, si qui penitus in his adfectionum cupiditatumque errores inessent, quos aliquis pudor reverens concelaret, ea omnia sine gravi periculo, libertate per vinum data detegi et ad corrigendum medendumque fieri oportuniora.
MacrobiusRecords the same bit as Gellius above and then adds:
Macrobius 2.8.7
Plato also said this in the same passage, that we ought not to avoid practices of this sort for struggling against the violence of wine and that there is no one who has ever seemed so constant and controlled that his life would not be tested in these very dangers of mistakes and in the illicit traps of pleasure.”
atque hoc etiam Plato ibidem dicit, non defugiendas esse huiusce modi exercitationes adversum propulsandam vini violentiam, neque ullum umquam continentem prorsum aut temperantem satis fideliter visum esse cui vita non inter ipsa errorum pericula et in mediis voluptatum inlecebris explorata sit.
We can get a bit more explicit:
From Athenaeus’ Deipnosophists (1.41.16-36)
“Mnestheus of Athens also insists that the Pythia commanded the Athenians to honor Dionysus as a doctor. So Alcaeus the Mitylenaean poet says:
Wet your lungs with wine, for the dog-star is rising. The season is rough: everything thirsts in this heat.
And elsewhere he says: “Let’s drink, for the dog star is rising.” Eupolis says that Callias is compelled to drink by Pythagoras so that “he may cleanse his lung before the dog star’s rise.” And it is not only the lung that gets dry, but the heart runs the same risk. That’s why Antiphanes says:
Tell me, why do we live? I say that it is to drink.* See how many trees alongside rushing streams Drink constantly throughout the day and night And how big and beautiful they grow. Those that abstain Wilt from the root up.
*A twitter correspondent has suggested that this really means “what is living, it is drinking”. This is definitely closer to the Greek idea; but I kept mine because I think it is punchier in English. Get it, punchier?
photograph of a red figure greek vase with a bearded figure reclining with a wine krater.
Baton, the Comic Poet (fr. 3.1-11, preserved in Athenaeus Deipn. 4.163b)
“I am calling the prudent philosophers here,
Those who never allow themselves anything good,
Those who seek a thoughtful man in every walk
And in their discussions as if he were a fugitive slave.
Wretched person, why are you sober if you have money?
Why do you dishonor the gods this much?
Why do you think money is worth more than you are?
Does it have some intrinsic worth?
If you drink water, you’re useless to the city.
You hurt the farmer and the trader at the same time.
But I make them wealthier by getting drunk.”
“What is the Odyssey about except about love,
A woman alone, pursued by many suitors while her husband’s gone.”
aut quid Odyssea est nisi femina propter amorem,
dum vir abest, multis una petita procis?
Aristotle, Rhetoric 1406b
“Alcidamas called the Odyssey a ‘fine mirror of human life’ ”
καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον
Michael Apostolios, Proverbia 14.56
“I will make your house a wooden horse”: this means I will make it disappear. Themistokles’ groom said this. It comes from the Wooden Horse at Troy, the one Odysseus used to take the city.”
“But I think that we old men might listen happily to someone reciting the Iliad and the Odyssey well and quickly declare that they were completely victorious! Who, then, would rightly be the winner—that’s the next issue, right?”
“Homer didn’t think it right to tell where he came from, who his parents were, no even what he should be called. Nope—instead, he’s happy if we don’t know the name of whoever composed the Iliad and the Odyssey.”
“Once he is struck by the wave,
And [comes] naked to a kind reception at Salmydessos
Where the top-knotted Thracians
Grab him—where he will suffer many evils
Eating the bread of slavery
He will shiver struck by the cold. When he emerges from the foam
May he puke up much seaweed
And let his teeth chatter, as he lies on his face
Like a dog in his weakness
At the farthest end of the sea…
I want him to see all of these things
Because he wronged me and broke his oath,
Even though he was once my friend before.”
I have placed in bold just a few of the fragments that remind me of Odyssean language. Although the phrase δούλιον ἄρτον does not appear in Homer, it does recall for me the phrase “day of slavery” (δούλιον ἦμαρ).
Athenaeus 15.698b
“Polemon in the 12th book of his Essay to Timaios writes on his inquiry into composers of parody:’ I would say that the parodists Boiotos and Euboios are clever because they toy with double meanings and surpass previous poets even though they are later born. Still, it needs to be said that the iambic poet Hipponax created the genre. He speaks in Hexameters:
Muse, tell me about the stomach slicing, sea-swallowing
Eurymedontes who was eating out of order so that
He was allotted a terrible death by the vote
Of all the people along the strand of the tireless sea.”
“Because he wanted to slander his enemies, [Hipponax] broke his meter and made it stumble instead of straight: he made the rhythm irregular. This is appropriate for surprise and attack. For rhythmic and smooth composition is more appropriate for praise than for blame. This is all I have to say about hiatus.”
Most people who know ancient Greek will probably associate ἄρτον with its more typical definition (“bread”) than with foreskin. I think that the explanation for this homonym may have to do with the latter definition developing from τὸ αἴρειν:
When I started posting on the Iliad last year, I was a bit unsure I would finish the project of a few posts per book, designed both for first time and experienced readers of the Iliad. Once I finished the project in April, this year, I found myself a little worn out and at a loss about what to do next. I am happy with my plan to post less, but to emphasize new or less well-known scholarship on the poem. But I also don’t want to just abandon 83 posts!
I was chatting with my friend (and fellow Homerist) Justin Arft last week and he compared Painful Signs (favorably) to introductory books on epic and suggested I could repackage this project as a book. This compliment made me remember that books can be a pain and that they can’t be updated easily. Also, I wanted this project to be open and available to anyone interested in the Iliad.
One of the problems with the post format, however, is that it is hard to follow in a linear fashion or to find something specifically. So, I have created this ‘table of contents’ below. I will update posts periodically as new things occur to me, as friends suggest changes, or when typos become two hard to ignore. I have put this “table of contents” on sententiae antiquaeas well, to provide a more stable home for the list.
If additional posts are desired for any given book; or, if there is a subset of Homeric scholarship you’d like covered, don’t hesitate to let me know.
As always, this project is free. But any funds it produces are sent monthly to Classics-adjacent non-profits.
Major Themes for Reading and Teaching the Iliad: A summary of five themes emphasized in the substack: (1) Politics, (2) Heroism; (3) Gods and Humans); (4) Family & Friends; (5) Narrative Traditions.
Does Homer Make Sh*t up?: Aphrodite’s Mom in Iliad 5 On innovation and tradition in Homer in generally; a discussion of Dione as Aphrodite’s mother in book 5
h: The subject catalogue (“Schlagwortkatalog”) of the University Library of Graz. The card shown refers to a text by Hans Schleimer who made up the rules for this catalogue. Like this lists of posts, a thing of the past.
