Tag: Friendship

Death and Love from Friendship

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Augustine, Confessions 4.8-9

“Certainly, the comfort of various friends used to repair and refresh me—friends whom I once loved in your place. This was an immense fiction and a long-lasting lie, the incitement of which in our ears made our mind corrupted. But my fiction would was not relenting even if some of my friends would die.

There were other things that attracted my mind more: conversation, laughter, doing each other favors, reading sweet-tongued books together, having fun, being serious, sometimes disagreeing without anger just as a people might do on his own and even mixing up our many agreements with occasional dissent. We get pain when some are absent only to receive them with joy as they return. By these kinds of signs coming from the heart of those who love and love in return, through their mouth, tongue, eyes and a thousand very grateful gestures,  fan the burning of our minds and  make one out of many.

This is what is loved in friends and what we love such that the human conscience—if it does not love what loves it back or if it does not return love when loved—seeks nothing from that source except for a sign of kindness. This is where grief comes from if someone dies—the shadows of sorrows—and when sweetness turns bitter a heart weighs heavy and the loss of the life of those who are dying is the death of those still alive.”

Maxime quippe me reparabant atque recreabant aliorum amicorum solacia, cum quibus amabam quod pro te amabam, et hoc erat ingens fabula et longum mendacium, cuius adulterina confricatione corrumpebatur mens nostra pruriens in auribus. sed illa mihi fabula non moriebatur, si quis amicorum meorum moreretur. alia erant quae in eis amplius capiebant animum, conloqui et conridere et vicissim benivole obsequi, simul legere libros dulciloquos, simul nugari et simul honestari, dissentire interdum sine odio tamquam ipse homo secum atque ipsa rarissima dissensione condire consensiones plurimas, docere aliquid invicem aut discere ab invicem, desiderare absentes cum molestia, suscipere venientes cum laetitia: his atque huius modi signis a corde amantium et redamantium procedentibus per os, per linguam, per oculos et mille motus gratissimos, quasi fomitibus conflare animos et ex pluribus unum facere.

 Hoc est quod diligitur in amicis, et sic diligitur ut rea sibi sit humana conscientia si non amaverit redamantem aut si amantem non redamaverit, nihil quaerens ex eius corpore praeter indicia benivolentiae. hinc ille luctus si quis moriatur, et tenebrae dolorum, et versa dulcedine in amaritudinem cor madidum, et ex amissa vita morientium mors viventium.

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Hot and cold bath Livre de la Vigne nostre Seigneur, France ca. 1450

Some Roman Morals for a Season of Gifts

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Cicero, De Officiis 3.118

“For goodness, generosity and kindness cannot exist any more than friendship if they are not pursued for themselves but are nurtured for the sake of pleasure or advantage.”

Neque enim bonitas nec liberalitas nec comitas esse potest, non plus quam amicitia, si haec non per se expetantur, sed ad voluptatem utilitatemve referantur.

Publilius Syrus, 78

“Generosity even devises an excuse for giving”

Benignus etiam causam dandi cogitat.

Seneca, De Beneficiis 4

“All generosity hurries—it is characteristic of one who does something willingly to do it quickly. If someone comes to help slowly or drags it out day by day, he does not do it sincerely. And he has thus lost the two most important things: time and a sign of his willing friendship. To be slowly willing is a sign of being unwilling.”

Omnis benignitas properat, et proprium est libenter facientis cito facere; qui tarde et diem de die extrahens profuit, non ex animo fecit. Ita duas res maximas perdidit, et tempus et argumentum amicae voluntatis; tarde velle nolentis est.

 

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Aeneas Panel from the Ara Pacis

Lessons of Love and Loyalty from the Purple Coot

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The purple coot is more properly known now as a purple swamphen

Aelian De Natura Animalium 5. 28

“The purple coot, as well as being very jealous, possesses this oddity as well. For people say that it cherishes its family and delights in a shared life with its companions. I heard that a rooster and a coot were raised together in the same house—they ate the same things, and they measured out the same steps, and got dirty in the same place. From these experiences, an amazing friendship developed between them.

Then, when there was a festival, the lord of the house sacrificed the rooster and included it in a banquet for the household. The purple coot, now without his companion and intolerant of the solitude, killed itself through starvation.”

Ἴδιον δὲ ἄρα <ὁ>πορφυρίων πρὸς τῷ ζηλοτυπώτατος εἶναι καὶ ἐκεῖνο δήπου κέκτηται. φιλοίκειον αὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν καὶ τὴν συντροφίαν τῶν συννόμων ἀγαπᾶν. ἐν οἰκίᾳ γοῦν τρέφεσθαι πορφυρίωνα καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνα ἤκουσα, καὶ σιτεῖσθαι μὲν τὰ αὐτά, βαδίζειν δὲ τὰς ἴσας βαδίσεις καὶ κοινῇ κονίεσθαι. οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν αὐτοῖς ἐγγενέσθαι. καί ποτε ἑορτῆς ἐπιστάσης ὁ δεσπότης ἀμφοῖν τὸν ἀλεκτρυόνα καταθύσας εἱστιάθη σὺν τοῖς οἰκείοις· ὁ δὲ πορφυρίων τὸν σύννομον οὐκ ἔχων καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν μὴ φέρων ἑαυτὸν ἀτροφίᾳ διέφθειρεν.

 

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Medicine for the Soul: Conversations with Friends

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The other day I was a little surprised to find the following definitions and etymologies of  pharmakon (“medicine”).

From the Suda

“Pharmakon [medicine]: conversation, consoling, it comes from pherein [bringing] akos [relief/cure]. But it is also said to come from flowers.

Φάρμακον: παραμυθία, ὁμιλία, εἴρηται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ φέρειν τὴν ἄκεσιν: εἴρηται δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθέων

Etym. Magn.

“Medicine: consolation, conversation. This is from pherein [to bear] and akos [relief], something close to pherakon

Φάρμακον: Παραμυθία, ὁμιλία· παρὰ τὸ φέρειν τὸ ἄκος, φέρακόν τι ὄν·

Chaintrain s.v. pharmakon, after surveying various approaches to its etymology (mostly reflexes of pherô and PIE *bher-) concludes “la question de l’origine de pharmakon est insoluble en l’ état present de nos connaissances.”

But it seems that the medicinal/therapeutic power of conversation was a popular trope in several contexts.

Some Proverbs from Arsenius, Paroemiographer

“Only words [reason] is medicine for grief”

Λόγος μέν ἐστι φάρμακον λύπης μόνος.

“Conversation [ or ‘reason’] is the doctor for suffering in the soul”

Λόγος ἰατρὸς τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν πάθους.

The palliative and or curative effect of stories and speech appears with some frequency in Euripides (and then appears in other authors as well)

Euripides, fr. 1065

“Many words of the ancients still ring true:
Their fine stories are medicine for mortal fear.”

καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν πόλλ’ ἔπη καλῶς ἔχει·
λόγοι γὰρ ἐσθλοὶ φάρμακον φόβου βροτοῖς.

 

Euripides, fr. 1079

“Mortals have no other medicine for pain
Like the advice of a good man, a friend
Who has experience with this sickness.
A man who troubles then calms his thoughts with drinking,
Finds immediate pleasure, but laments twice as much later on.”

Οὐκ ἔστι λύπης ἄλλο φάρμακον βροτοῖς
ὡς ἀνδρὸς ἐσθλοῦ καὶ φίλου παραίνεσις.
ὅστις δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ νόσῳ ξυνὼν ἀνὴρ
μέθῃ ταράσσει καὶ γαληνίζει φρένα,
παραυτίχ’ ἡσθεὶς ὕστερον στένει διπλᾶ.

 

Eur. Fr. 962

“There are different medicines for different diseases.
A kind story [muthos] from friends for a man in grief;
Advice for someone playing the fool to excess”

. . . ἄλλ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἄλλῃ φάρμακον κεῖται νόσῳ·
λυπουμένῳ μὲν μῦθος εὐμενὴς φίλων,
ἄγαν δὲ μωραίνοντι νουθετήματα.

Menander (fr. 591 K.).

“The man who is sick in the body needs a doctor;
someone who is sick in the mind needs a friend
For a well-meaning friend knows how to treat grief.”

Τῷ μὲν τὸ σῶμα † διατεθειμένῳ κακῶς
χρεία ‘στ’ ἰατροῦ, τῷ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν φίλου·
λύπην γὰρ εὔνους οἶδε θεραπεύειν φίλος.

Attributed to Socrates (in Stobaeus)

“The sick need doctors; the unlucky need encouragement from friends.”

Τοῖς μὲν νοσοῦσιν ἰατρούς, τοῖς δ’ ἀτυχοῦσι φίλους δεῖ παραινεῖν.

 

Euripides, Alcestis, 962—966

I have leapt through the Muses
And soared high but
Even though I have tried most words
I have found nothing stronger than Necessity
Not any medicine at all.

᾿Εγὼ καὶ διὰ Μούσας
καὶ μετάρσιος ᾖξα καὶ
πλείστων ἁψάμενος λόγων
κρεῖσσον οὐδὲν ᾿Ανάγκας
εὗρον, οὐδέ τι φάρμακον.

Sotion, About Rage

“Consolation is the greatest medicine for anger,
It counters grief, anger, and brings forgetfulness from all evils.”

῞Οτι ἡ παραμυθία φάρμακον ἀνίας ἐστὶ μέγιστον,
νηπενθές τ’ ἄχολόν τε, κακῶν ἐπίληθον ἁπάντων.

Biôn (c. XIV Herm., XVIII Ahr.).

“Love should summon the Muses; the Muses should carry love.
The Muses—I hope—give song to me always when I need it,
Sweet song, no medicine is more pleasing!”

Μοίσας ῎Ερως καλέοι, Μοῖσαι τὸν ῎Ερωτα φέροιεν·
μολπὰν ταὶ Μοῖσαί μοι ἀεὶ ποθέοντι διδοῖεν,
τὰν γλυκερὰν μολπάν, τᾶς φάρμακον ἅδιον οὐδέν.

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All of these quotes make me rethink the following from the Odyssey (14.399-400):

“Let us take pleasure from recalling one another’s grievous pains”

κήδεσιν ἀλλήλων τερπώμεθα λευγαλέοισι / μνωομένω

The Highest Good: Friendship

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Two passages in Latin About Friendship

Seneca, De Tranquilitate Animi

“Still nothing lightens the spirit as much as sweet and faithful friendship. What a good it is when hearts have been made ready in which every secret may be safely deposited, whose understanding of yourself you worry about less than your own, whose conversation relieves your fear, whose opinion hastens your plans, whose happiness dispels your sadness, and whose very sight delights you!”

Nihil tamen aeque oblectaverit animum, quam amicitia fidelis et dulcis. Quantum bonum est, ubi praeparata sunt pectora, in quae tuto secretum omne descendat, quorum conscientiam minus quam tuam timeas, quorum sermo sollicitudinem leniat, sententia consilium expediat, hilaritas tristitiam dissipet, conspectus ipse delectet!

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Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy 3.35

“The most sacred thing of all is friends, something not recorded as luck but as virtue, since the rest of the goods are embraced with a view toward power or pleasure.”

amicorum vero quod sanctissimum quidem genus est, non in fortuna sed in virtute numeratur, reliquum vero vel potentiae causa vel delectationis assumitur

On Brotherhood and Shared Friendships

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Plutarch, On Brotherly Love 490f-491a

“Friendships transform your character and there is no greater sign of a difference in character than in choosing different friends. This is why neither eating nor drinking nor playing and spending time with a brother is so firm a foundation of agreement as shared friendship, enmity, and enjoying time with the same people and, in turn, hating and shunning alike. For common friendships do not endure slander or feuds—instead, if some anger or complaint should arise, it is resolved by the intervention of friends who accept this responsibility and mediate if they are well-disposed toward both sides and have a similar good-will in common. Just as tin may rejoin broken bronze and bonds it together when soldered to both sides because it is suited similarly to both, so too it is right that a friend who is well-suited and shared by both brothers can increase their goodwill. But those are unbalanced and unshared are disharmonious, just as off-key notes in a musical scale. Just so, it is possible to wonder whether Hesiod was right or not when he said: “Never make a friend equal to a brother.” (Works and Days, 707).

ἠθοποιοῦσι γὰρ αἱ φιλίαι, καὶ μεῖζον οὐθέν ἐστιν ἠθῶν διαφορᾶς σημεῖον ἢ φίλων αἱρέσεις διαφερόντων. ὅθεν οὔτε τὸ συνεσθίειν ἀδελφῷ καὶ συμπίνειν οὔτε τὸ συμπαίζειν καὶ συνδιημερεύειν οὕτω συνεκτικόν ἐστιν ὁμονοίας ὡς τὸ συμφιλεῖν καὶ συνεχθραίνειν ἥδεσθαι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς συνόντα καὶ πάλιν βδελύττεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ διαβολὰς αἱ κοιναὶ φιλίαι φέρουσιν οὐδὲ συγκρούσεις· ἀλλὰ κἂν γένηταί τις ὀργὴ καὶ μέμψις, ἐκλύεται διὰ μέσου τῶν φίλων ἐκδεχομένων καὶ διασκεδαννύντων, ἄνπερ ἀμφοτέροις οἰκείως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους ὁμοῦ τῇ εὐνοίᾳ συννεύωσιν. | ὡς γὰρ ὁ κασσίτερος ῥαγέντα τὸν χαλκὸν συναρμόττει καὶ συγκεράννυσι τῷ ψαύειν ἑκατέρου πέρατος οἰκείως ὁμοπαθὴς γινόμενος, οὕτως δεῖ τὸν φίλον εὐάρμοστον ὄντα καὶ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς προσκαταπυκνοῦν τὴν εὔνοιαν· οἱ δ’ ἄνισοι καὶ ἄμικτοι καθάπερ ἐν διαγράμματι μουσικῷ φθόγγοι διάζευξιν οὐ συναφὴν ποιοῦσιν. ἔστιν οὖν διαπορῆσαι πότερον ὀρθῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον ὁ ῾Ησίοδος εἶπε

(OD 707)

 

‘μηδὲ κασιγνήτῳ ἶσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταῖρον.’

Replacing Your Brother is Like Cutting off a Limb

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Plutarch, On Brotherly Love 479 B-D

 

“The Arcadian prophet*, according to Herodototus, was compelled to have a wooden foot made after he lost his own. But when a brother makes an enemy of his brother and then obtains a surrogate companion from the marketplace or the gym he isn’t doing anything other than cutting off a natural part of his body willingly and then fashioning and applying some alien prosthetic. For a need to seek and welcome friendship and companionship instructs us to honor, cultivate and guard our family because we are not able or created to live friendless, solitary or self-sufficient lives. This is why Menander says rightly (fr.554)

We don’t seek from drinking or daily dining
Someone we trust with our life, father.
Doesn’t each man think he has discovered
An exceptional good when he has only a shadow of a friend?

For most friendships are really shadows—imitations and dreams of that first closeness which nature fosters in children towards parents and towards siblings.   How can a man who does not revere or honor this relationship give any goodwill to others?”

Dioscuri
Castor and Pollux Could Depend on Each Other…

ὁ μὲν οὖν ᾿Αρκαδικὸς μάντις ἀναγκαίως πόδα ξύλινον προσεποιήσατο καθ’ ῾Ηρόδοτον (IX 37) τοῦ οἰκείου στερηθείς· ἀδελφὸς δὲ πολεμῶν ἀδελφῷ καὶ κτώμενος ὀθνεῖον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἢ παλαίστρας ἑταῖρον οὐθὲν ἔοικεν ἄλλο ποιεῖν ἢ σάρκινον καὶ συμφυὲς ἑκουσίως ἀποκόψας μέλος ἀλλότριον προστίθεσθαι καὶ προσαρμόττειν. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ προσδεχομένη καὶ ζητοῦσα φιλίαν καὶ ὁμιλίαν χρεία διδάσκει τὸ συγγενὲς τιμᾶν καὶ περιέπειν καὶ διαφυλάττειν, ὡς ἀφίλους καὶ ἀμίκτους καὶ μονοτρόπους ζῆν μὴ δυναμένους μηδὲ πεφυκότας. ὅθεν ὁ Μένανδρος ὀρθῶς (fr. 554)

 

‘οὐκ ἐκ πότων καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἡμέραν τρυφῆς
ζητοῦμεν ᾧ πιστεύσομεν τὰ τοῦ βίου’ φησί,
‘πάτερ. οὐ περιττὸν οἴετ’ ἐξευρηκέναι
ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστος, ἂν ἔχῃ φίλου σκιάν;’

 

σκιαὶ γάρ εἰσιν ὄντως αἱ πολλαὶ φιλίαι καὶ μιμήματα καὶ εἴδωλα τῆς πρώτης ἐκείνης, ἣν παισί τε πρὸς γονεῖς ἡ φύσις ἀδελφοῖς τε πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς ἐμπεποίηκε, κἀκείνην ὁ μὴ σεβόμενος μηδὲ τιμῶν ὅρα τίνα πίστιν εὐνοίας τοῖς  ἀλλοτρίοις δίδωσιν;

 

 

 

*Hegesitratos from Elis, see Herodotus 9.37.

The Real Profit of Wisdom with Friends

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From Xenophon’s Memorobilia 1.6.13

In this passage Socrates argues against the sophists’ practice of taking money to teach about wisdom. In modern terms, Socrates might be seen as arguing against the commodification of our everyday relationships and exchanges. One can only imagine his responses to the notion of the ‘sharing economy’.

“Socrates responded to these things, “Antiphon, we share the belief that there is both a noble and a shameful way to share beauty and wisdom. For if someone offers beauty to anyone who wants it for money, people call him a prostitute. But if someone makes someone he knows who is a good and noble lover into a friend, we consider it prudent. It is the same way with wisdom: people call men who sell it to anyone who wishes for money a sophist [just like prostitutes] but whoever makes a friend of anyone he knows as capable and teaches him whatever good he can, we think that he has accomplished the duties of a good and noble citizen.

This, then, is how I proceed myself, Antiphon, just as some might get excited about a good horse, or a dog or a bird, I am so much more eager for good friends. And, if I know anything good, I teach it and I suggest others to them from whom I think they might gain some benefit concerning virtue. I also work through the treasures left by the wise men of old—those they have left in writing their books—opening them with my friends and picking out whatever good we discover.  We consider this a great profit, if we become mutual friends* in this way.”

Socrates

ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· ῏Ω ᾿Αντιφῶν, παρ’ ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τήν τε  γὰρ ὥραν ἐὰν μέν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν· καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ

βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς [ὥσπερ πόρνους] ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δὲ ὃν ἂν γνῷ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν. ἐγὼ δ’ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ ᾿Αντιφῶν, ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις ἢ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἥδεται, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἥδομαι φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐάν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρ’ ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαί τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν· καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, καὶ ἄν τι ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθὸν ἐκλεγόμεθα· καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις φίλοι* γιγνώμεθα.

 

* φίλοι: has a manuscript variant of ὠφέλιμοι. So the phrase could be “if we are/become beneficial to each other.”

Plato, Lysis 211e5-6: Socrates on Friendship

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“I am rather tame concerning the possession of other things but nearly erotic when it comes to acquiring friends.”

ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα πρᾴως ἔχω, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν φίλων κτῆσιν πάνυ ἐρωτικῶς

In this dialogue Plato’s Socrates is voluble about the importance of friends (if we take him seriously)

Wisdom makes people want to be your friend:

Plato, Lysis 210d

“If you are wise, then everyone will be your family and friend.”

ἐὰν μὲν ἄρα σοφὸς γένῃ, ὦ παῖ, πάντες σοι φίλοι καὶ πάντες σοι οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται

(Because you are useful and good)

And a friend is much more important than wealth:

Plato, Lysis 211e5-6

“I would much rather acquire a friend than all of Darius’ gold.”

οἶμαι δέ…μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Δαρείου χρυσίον κτήσασθαι δεξαίμην πολὺ πρότερον ἑταῖρον

A sweet sentiment certainly, but typically undermined by Socrates’ claims soon thereafter that he doesn’t understand how men become friends of one another. Poor Socrates, he’s like Polyphemos who loves Galatea: she’s a sea nymph and he can’t swim.

(See the full text here.)

And Socrates would probably be disappointed by the later wisdom on friendship from someone like Ovid:

Ovid, Epistulae ex Ponto 2.3.7-8

“It is shameful to say, but — if truth be told — most people value their friendships on utilitarian grounds”.

Turpe quidem dictu, sed – si modo uera fatemur – 
 uulgus amicitias utilitate probat.

On Enduring Shame for the Sake of Friends: Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 1.3.21-23

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“Theophrastus, in the book I already discussed, addresses the same matter which Cicero does, but more extensively and more pointedly. But he too does not make his opinion clear concerning distinguishing about a solitary and separate action—he does not use clearly established examples, but discusses classes of action in summary in close to the following:

“A small and rather thin shame or bad reputation ought to be endured if it is possible through it to be of great advantage to a friend. Certainly, the loss from a compromised sense of honor is repaid and repaired by some greater or weightier service to a friend and that momentary slip, or in a way, your damaged reputation is made whole again with the fine material of usefulness to a friend.”

21 Theophrastus autem in eo, quo dixi, libro inquisitius quidem super hac ipsa re et exactius pressiusque quam Cicero disserit. 22 Set is quoque in docendo non de unoquoque facto singillatim existimat neque certis exemplorum documentis, set generibus rerum summatim universimque utitur ad hunc ferme modum: 23 “Parva” inquit “et tenuis vel turpitudo vel infamia subeunda est, si ea re magna utilitas amico quaeri potest. Rependitur quippe et compensatur leve damnum delibatae honestatis maiore alia gravioreque in adiuvando amico honestate, minimaque illa labes et quasi lacuna famae munimentis partarum amico utilitatium solidatur.