Need, Benefit, Fear: Ancient Thinkers on the Origin of the Social Contract

We often make a lot of noise about our political beliefs and affiliations without coming straight out and saying what we think a government is for. Such questions are not merely ‘academic’–without an articulation of core beliefs, politics devolves into mere tribalism.

Today is the start of a virtual conference  “Teaching Leaders and Leadership Through Classics” . (You can participate by registering). In teaching courses on leadership, I have found that students are sometimes surprised by the questions “What is a state for? Why do we have government?”

In thinking about ancient politics and leadership, it is important to consider what authors say about where governments come from: Ancient states did not have constitutions and guiding treatises, they had traditions. But, sometimes, authors spoke to the issue directly.

A city develops to help us pursue the good?

Aristotle, Politics 1252a1-8

“Since we recognize that every state is some kind of a partnership and that every partnership has been undertaken for the sake of some good—for it seems that all people do everything for what seems good—it is clear that all states pursue some benefit, but that the most powerful state of all pursues the most powerful benefit which also includes all others. This state is called the city and this partnership is political.”

    ᾿Επειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική.

What is good? Is it to supply something we’re missing?

Plato, Republic 369b

“A city develops, I believe, because each of us isn’t self-sufficient— we lack much of what we need. Is there any other reason to build a community?”

γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ὢν ἐνδεής: ἢ τίν᾽ οἴει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν;

Perhaps the good is to avoid what is bad…

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 5.1145-1160

“The human race, tired of living in a state of violence 
and languishing in feuds, was eager 
to submit to law and strict judgments.
Otherwise, each person would turn to vengeance
More harshly than our current laws allow,
And this is why people have avoided living in a state of violence.
From here comes the fear that alters life’s rewards
Since violence and pain entrap the one who wields them
And tend to return most to those who acted first.
It isn’t easy to lead a quiet and peaceful life
If you break the faith of a community’s written peace.
Even if you deceive the races of god and man,
There’s no way to be sure to keep a secret forever.
Often many reveal themselves by speaking in sleep
Or confused by a lengthy illness, they finally
Disclose their deeply hidden memories and sins.”

nam genus humanum, defessum vi colere aevom,
ex inimicitiis languebat; quo magis ipsum
sponte sua cecidit sub leges artaque iura.

acrius ex ira quod enim se quisque parabat
ulcisci quam nunc concessumst legibus aequis,
hanc ob rem est homines pertaesum vi colere aevom.
inde metus maculat poenarum praemia vitae.
circumretit enim vis atque iniuria quemque
atque unde exortast, ad eum plerumque revertit,
nec facilest placidam ac pacatam degere vitam
qui violat factis communia foedera pacis.
etsi fallit enim divom genus humanumque,
perpetuo tamen id fore clam diffidere debet;
quippe ubi se multi per somnia saepe loquentes
aut morbo delirantes protraxe ferantur
et celata [mala] in medium et peccata dedisse.

Image result for Ancient Roman Government

Xenophon Memorabilia 2.1.12-14

Socrates: “Come now, if only this path wouldn’t lead through men at all, just as through slavery or dominion, you would be saying something. But, as it is, since you live among human beings, if you think it right neither to rule nor to be ruled, nor again to serve rulers willingly, I think that you may see that the stronger know how to make those weaker weep in public and in private—and how to use them as slaves. Or does it escape you that they cut the grain and harvest the trees where others have sown and planted, or that the powerful set siege to the weaker in every way until they “persuade” them to choose to serve as slaves instead of warring against the stronger? Don’t you think it’s the same in private life—that brave and capable men prey upon the weak and powerless once they have enslaved them?”

Aristippus said, “But, indeed, to avoid suffering these things, I do not bind myself to any state—I am a stranger [guest/foreigner] everywhere.”

Socrates: “You have now described a clever trick!” For since the time of Sinis, Skeiron and Procrustes died, no one has done a stranger wrong! But now men gathered together in their states and make laws so that they might not suffer harm, that they might acquire friends as help beyond what they have acquired by birth, and they have built defenses around their cities and acquired weapons to defend themselves against those who might do them wrong and, in addition to this, they have managed to make alliances in other lands. And even those who have done all these things still suffer injustice. Now you, who have none of these advantages, you spend time on the roads where men suffer harm the most and in every city you arrive you arrive you are weaker than all of the citizens—you are the sort of man who are especially exposed to those who want to harm someone. Given all this, you think that you will not suffer harm because you are a “guest”? Is it because the cities announce your safety when you are coming and going that you are so bold? Or is it because you think that you’re the kind of man who’d be of profit to no master? For who would welcome a man into his home who delights in living well but is unwilling to work?”

᾿Αλλ’ εἰ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ οὔτε δι’ ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας ἡ ὁδὸς αὕτη φέρει, οὕτω μηδὲ δι’ ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως ἄν τι λέγοις· εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὢν μήτε ἄρχειν ἀξιώσεις μήτε ἄρχεσθαι μηδὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑκὼν θεραπεύσεις, οἶμαί σε ὁρᾶν ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ κρείττονες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλαίοντας καθίσαντες δούλοις χρῆσθαι· ἢ λανθάνουσί σε οἱ ἄλλων σπειράντων καὶ φυτευσάντων τόν τε σῖτον τέμνοντες καὶ δενδροκοποῦντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον πολιορκοῦντες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ μὴ θέλοντας θεραπεύειν, ἕως ἂν πείσωσιν ἑλέσθαι δουλεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι; καὶ ἰδίᾳ αὖ οἱ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀδυνάτους οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι καταδουλωσάμενοι καρποῦνται;

᾿Αλλ’ ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη, ἵνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδ’ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Τοῦτο ἤδη λέγεις δεινὸν πάλαισμα. τοὺς γὰρ ξένους, ἐξ οὗ ὅ τε Σίνις καὶ ὁ Σκείρων καὶ ὁ Προκρούστης ἀπέθανον, οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ· ἀλλὰ νῦν οἱ μὲν πολιτευόμενοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι καὶ νόμους τίθενται, ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ φίλους πρὸς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλουμένοις ἄλλους κτῶνται βοηθούς, καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐρύματα περιβάλλονται, καὶ ὅπλα κτῶνται οἷς  ἀμυνοῦνται τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἄλλους ἔξωθεν συμμάχους κατασκευάζονται· καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα πάντα κεκτημένοι ὅμως ἀδικοῦνται· σὺ δὲ οὐδὲν μὲν τούτων ἔχων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁδοῖς, ἔνθα πλεῖστοι ἀδικοῦνται, πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβων, εἰς ὁποίαν δ’ ἂν πόλιν ἀφίκῃ, τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἥττων ὤν, καὶ τοιοῦτος, οἵοις μάλιστα ἐπιτίθενται οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀδικεῖν, ὅμως διὰ τὸ ξένος εἶναι οὐκ ἂν οἴει ἀδικηθῆναι; ἦ διότι αἱ πόλεις σοι κηρύττουσιν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ προσιόντι καὶ ἀπιόντι, θαρρεῖς; ἢ διότι καὶ δοῦλος ἂν οἴει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος μηδενὶ δεσπότῃ λυσιτελεῖν; τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐθέλοι ἄνθρωπον ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχειν πονεῖν μὲν μηδὲν ἐθέλοντα, τῇ δὲ πολυτελεστάτῃ διαίτῃ χαίροντα;

The Difference Between Tyrants and Kings

Starting tomorrow a virtual conference “Teaching Leaders and Leadership Through Classics” is going live. (You can participate by registering). Part of the conversation there will be what ancient authors have to say about leadership and how their words resonate today. Over the past year, we have had many reasons to think about what influences our decisions to choose leaders. But that doesn’t mean we are any closer to understanding it.

So, here are some passages about tyranny, for no particular reason.

Why would some one choose an autocrat? Because he is awesome. That’s why.

Aristotle, Politics 1284b25-34

“But in the best state, there is an important question: what should be done when a man is conspicuous not for some other quality such as strength, wealth or networks of friends but for virtue? For, indeed, no one would claim it is right to exile or disenfranchise a man like this. Nor could you say that we should rule him. For if would be the same as if they should think it right to split up the duties and rule over Zeus. What is left, and what seems natural, is for everyone to obey a man like this happily in order to make this type of king revered in their cities.”

ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλὰ ἄν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ’ ἀρετήν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ  γὰρ δὴ φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου· παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς. λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

Plato uses lycanthropy to describe a man’s transformation into a tyrant.

From Plato’s Republic, Book 8 (565d)

“What is the beginning of the change from guardian to tyrant? Isn’t clear when the guardian begins to do that very thing which myth says happened at the shrine of Lykaion Zeus in Arcadia?

Which is? He said.

That once someone tastes a bit of human innards mixed up with the other sacrifices he becomes a wolf by necessity? Haven’t you heard this tale?

I have.

Is it not something the same with a protector of the people? Once he controls a mob that obeys him, he cannot restrain himself from tribal blood, but he prosecutes unjustly, the sorts of things men love to do, and brings a man into court for murder, eliminating the life of a man—and with tongue and unholy mouth that have tasted the murder of his kind, he exiles, kills, and promises the cutting of debts and the redistribution of land. Is it not by necessity that such a man is fated either to be killed by his enemies or to become a tyrant, to turn into a wolf from a man?”

Τίς ἀρχὴ οὖν μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν ἄρξηται δρᾶν ὁ προστάτης τῷ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὃς περὶ τὸ ἐν ᾿Αρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν λέγεται;

Τίς; ἔφη.

῾Ως ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας τὸν λόγον;

῎Εγωγε.

῏Αρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν δήμου προεστώς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον, μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλ’ ἀδίκως ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια ἄγων μιαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων, γλώττῃ τε καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γευόμενος φόνου συγγενοῦς, καὶ ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτεινύῃ καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἆρα τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἵμαρται ἢ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι;

In ancient Greek myth, Lykaon (Lycaon, related to lúkos, “wolf”) was a king of Arcadia. According to Pausanias (8.31-5) , Lykaon sacrificed a newborn child to Zeus. In other sources he offers the infant mixed up with other food to test Zeus’ divinity (although some attribute the deed to his sons, see Apollodorus, 3.8.1). Zeus killed the sons with lightning; Lykaon was transformed into a wolf.

There may actually be physical evidence of human sacrifice in Arcadia now.

Where does the word tyrant come from?

Continue reading “The Difference Between Tyrants and Kings”

Hangovers: Poems and Cures

From the Suda:

Kraipalê: The pounding that comes from drinking too much wine. We also have the participle “carousing” which is when someone acts poorly because of drinking, or just being drunk. It derives from the word “head” (kara) and “pound” (pallein). Or, it could also come from screwing up (sphallesthai) timely matters (kairiôn)

Κραιπάλη: ὁ ἐκ πολλῆς οἰνώσεως παλμός. καὶ Κραιπαλῶν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκ μέθης ἀτακτοῦντα, μεθύοντα. ἀπὸ τοῦ κάρα πάλλειν τοὺς μεθύοντας. ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ σφάλλεσθαι τῶν καιρίων.

Kraipalôdês: “Prone to drunkenness”: The ancients knew well the weaknesses of the spirit, weather it was a person who was prone to excessive drinking or a love-seeker who has his brain in his genitals.”

Κραιπαλώδης· τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ἐλαττώματα κατηπίσταντο, εἴτε κραιπαλώδης τις εἴη καὶ μέθυσος εἴτε φιλήδονος καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰδοίοις ἔχων τὸν ἐγκέφαλον.

Kraipalaikômos“Hangover-revel”: Metonymically, this a song that happens while drunk

Κραιπαλαίκωμος: μετωνυμικῶς ὁ κατὰ μέθην γινόμενος ὕμνος.

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Alexis, fr. 287

“Yesterday you drank too much and now you’re hungover.
Take a nap—this will help it. Then let someone give you
Cabbage, boiled.”

ἐχθὲς ὑπέπινες, εἶτα νυνὶ κραιπαλᾷς.
κατανύστασον· παύσῃ γάρ. εἶτά σοι δότω
ῥάφανόν τις ἑφθήν.

Eubulus, fr. 124

“Woman, it’s because you think I am a cabbage that you’re trying
To give me your hangover. At least, that’s how it seems to me.”

γύναι,
ῥάφανόν με νομίσασ’ εἰς ἐμέ σου τὴν κραιπάλην
μέλλεις ἀφεῖναι πᾶσαν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς.

Nikokharês
“Tomorrow we will boil acorns instead of cabbage
To treat our hangover.”

εἰσαύριον .. ἀντὶ ῥαφάνων ἑψήσομεν
βαλάνιον, ἵνα νῷν ἐξάγῃ τὴν κραιπάλην.

Alexis, fr. 390

“If only we got hangovers before we drank
Then no one would ever drink more
Than is good for them. But now, because
We do not expect to escape drinking’s penalty,
We too eagerly drink unmixed wines”

εἰ τοῦ μεθύσκεσθαι πρότερον τὸ κραιπαλᾶν
παρεγίνεθ’ ἡμῖν, οὐδ’ ἂν εἷς οἶνόν ποτε
προσίετο πλείω τοῦ μετρίου. νυνὶ δὲ τὴν
τιμωρίαν οὐ προσδοκῶντες τῆς μέθης
ἥξειν προχείρως τοὺς ἀκράτους πίνομεν.

Sopater

“It is sweet for men to drink at dawn
Streams of honey when they are struck by thirst
Driven by the last night’s hangover”

νᾶμα μελισσῶν ἡδὺ μὲν ὄρθρου
καταβαυκαλίσαι τοῖς ὑπὸ πολλῆς
κραιπαλοβόσκου δίψης κατόχοις.

How to Cure a Hangover…

Continue reading “Hangovers: Poems and Cures”

Salutati Continues the Attack on Aristotelian Impostors

(Note: This is a follow-up to the previous post, Salutati Attacks Aristotelian Impostors )

(3.) It is a shame to see those men in their disputes, as they fabricate and propose a silly question in unintelligible and totally contrived terms. They cut up many things in a joking way, as though they meant to take them back up, and exercise themselves by responding to them in turn; they sprinkle around some propositions, they toss in some corollaries, and they heap up the conclusions.

(4.) And you can see them confirm their proofs of all of these things with various added (or perhaps I should say that they are winged, and flying) calculations. Aye indeed, it is a true shame to hear them in their disputes, when you perceive that because they lack any substance, they rely on their terms alone and seek nothing more than to bark as loud as the rest. But why should I talk about them as debaters? When they are in the mood to say nothing, or at any rate very little, about the question at hand, they instead contrive to capture their opponent in the snare of some idle sophistry.

(3.) Pudor est ipsos disputantes aspicere cum texentes quandam quodam modo cantilenam questionem verbis inintelligibilibus formatisque proponunt. Multa cavillosis sectionibus, in quarum alternatione respondendo versentur, quasi resumenda premittunt, propositiones spargunt, corollaria adiciunt, conclusiones accumulant.

(4.) Et horum omnium probationes allatis, ne dicam alatis et evolantibus, rationibus eos videas confirmare. Et vere pudor est ipsos disputantes audire, cum rebus inanes cernas solum inniti terminis et nichil magis appetere quam in equivoco delatrare. Quid de arguentibus loquar? Qui cum de questione nichil aut paucissima dicturi sint, alicuius sophysmatis laqueo nituntur capere disputantem.

Salutati Attacks Aristotelian Impostors

(1.) I do not think that it will be irrelevant, since all of our education is wrapped up with those things which the poets have sung about the deeds of Hercules, to preface by saying a bit about poesy. For I see that not only the vulgar mob, but even those who in our time boast that they are philosophers, will sometimes consider poetry of little value, and sometimes even condemn it entirely. Nor does the authority of their own teacher (since they consider themselves Aristotelians), whom they read – or, to speak more truly, whom they are capable of reading – move them to make use of the various poets not on fleeting occasions but at all times in the most refined studies.

(2.) But indeed, I do not wonder at them; rather, I am indgnant, and I grieve. For, although they typically brag that they fly about through the loftiest summits of logic (or, loyce, as they call it in their own corrupt way) and philosophy, and they are prepared to discourse on all subjects with disputatious loquacity, they neither understand the texts of Aristotle, nor do they even read them, but instead they seek out I know not what tracts from the “British, divided from the whole world[1]”, as if our own country were not sufficiently stocked with erudition. They seize upon these works during long lamp-lit nights and learn, without books and without the assistance of textual witnesses, dialectic, physics, and whatever else transcendental speculation can disclose; or perhaps I should say that they boast that they have learned something, now that the traditions of their master have been abandoned.

[1] Vergil, Eclouges 1.66: At nos hinc alii sitientis ibimus Afros,
pars Scythiam et rapidum cretae veniemus Oaxen               65
et penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos.

File:Aristotle. Woodcut by T. Stimmer (?), 1589. Wellcome V0000204EL.jpg

(1.) Non ab re futurum arbitror, cum omnis institutio nostra versetur circa ea que poete de rebus Herculis cecinerunt, aliquid de poetica prelibare. Hanc enim video non solum profanum vulgus sed etiam qui se philosophos nostro tempore gloriantur tum parvi pendere, tum damnare. Nec movet istos etiam sui magistri (cum se Aristotelicos profiteantur) autoritas, quem legunt, sive, ut verius loquar, legere possunt, non semel sed ubique varios poetas etiam in rebus subtilissimis allegare.

(2.) Verum ipsos non admiror, potius autem indignor et doleo. Nam cum per logices, imo (ut corrupto vocabulo dicunt) loyce, et philosophie cacumina volitare se iactent et de cunctis disputatione garrula discutere sint parati (proh pudor!), textus Aristotelicos nec intelligunt nec legunt sed nescio quos tractatus apud <<toto divisos orbe Britannos>>, quasi noster eruditioni non sufficiat situs, querunt. Quos totis lucubrationibus amplectentes sine libris et sine testium adminiculis et dialeticam et physicam et quicquid transcendens speculatio rimatur ediscunt, sive potius edidicisse relicitis sui magistri traditionibus gloriantur.

What To Do With an Exceptional Man?

In which Aristotle gets frightening (because people take this stuff very seriously):

 

Aristotle, Politics 1284b25-34

“But in the best state, there is an important question: what should be done when a man is conspicuous not for some other quality such as strength, wealth or networks of friends but for virtue? For, indeed, no one would claim it is right to exile or disenfranchise a man like this. Nor could you say that we should rule him. For if would be the same as if they should think it right to split up the duties and rule over Zeus. What is left, and what seems natural, is for everyone to obey a man like this happily in order to make this type of king revered in their cities.”

ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλὰ ἄν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ’ ἀρετήν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ  γὰρ δὴ φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου· παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς. λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

 

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Ancient Greek has no Word for Frenemy: The Differences Between Plato and Aristotle

Aelian, 3.19

“It is reported that the first difference between Plato and Aristotle developed for the following reasons. Plato was displeased with Aristotle’s life, and in the clothing he selected. See, Aristotle dressed in well-made clothes and shoes; he also had his haircut in a manner disliked by Plato; he also took pride in wearing many rings. His face, moreover, bore a certain aspect of derision; and within this face, an untimely talkativeness brought his character into question too. All these characteristics are obviously foreign to a philosopher. When Plato saw them, he was repelled by the man and preferred Xenocrates, Speusippos, Amykles, and others. These men received his respect and regular conversation.

When Xenocrates was out of town to visit his home, Aristotle set upon Plato and made a chorus of his companions around him with Mnason of Phocis and other similar men. Speusippus was ill and was incapable of walking with Plato who was already eighty years old. Thanks to his age, he had lost some parts of his memory. Aristotle plotted against him and set upon him: he questioned him rather aggressively and in the manner of refutation, which was clearly unjust and unsympathetic. Because of this, Plato stopped going for his walk outside; he walked inside with his friends.”

athens

Λέγεται τὴν διαφορὰν ᾿Αριστοτέλους πρὸς Πλάτωνα τὴν πρώτην ἐκ τούτων γενέσθαι. οὐκ ἠρέσκετο τῷ βίῳ αὐτοῦ ὁ Πλάτων οὐδὲ τῇ κατασκευῇ τῇ περὶ τὸ σῶμα. καὶ γὰρ ἐσθῆτι ἐχρῆτο περιέργῳ ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης καὶ ὑποδέσει, καὶ κουρὰν δὲ ἐκείρετο καὶ ταύτην ἀήθη Πλάτωνι, καὶ δακτυλίους δὲ πολλοὺς φορῶν ἐκαλλύνετο ἐπὶ τούτῳ· καὶ μωκία δέ τις ἦν αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἄκαιρος στωμυλία λαλοῦντος κατηγόρει καὶ αὕτη τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἔστιν ἀλλότρια φιλοσόφου, δῆλον. ἅπερ οὖν ὁρῶν ὁ Πλάτων οὐ προσίετο τὸν ἄνδρα, προετίμα δὲ αὐτοῦ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Σπεύσιππον καὶ ᾿Αμύκλαν καὶ ἄλλους, τῇ τε λοιπῇ δεξιούμενος αὐτοὺς τιμῇ καὶ οὖν καὶ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τῶν λόγων.

ἀποδημίας δὲ γενομένης ποτὲ τῷ Ξενοκράτει ἐς τὴν πατρίδα, ἐπέθετο τῷ Πλάτωνι ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης, χορόν τινα τῶν ὁμιλητῶν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ περιστησάμενος, ὧν ἦν Μνάσων τε ὁ Φωκεὺς καὶ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι. ἐνόσει δὲ τότε ὁ Σπεύσιππος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος ἦν συμβαδίζειν τῷ Πλάτωνι. ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ὀγδοήκοντα ἔτη ἐγεγόνει, καὶ ὁμοῦ τι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐπελελοίπει τὰ τῆς μνήμης αὐτόν. ἐπιθέμενος οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπιβουλεύων ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης, καὶ φιλοτίμως πάνυ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις ποιούμενος καὶ τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἐλεγκτικῶς, ἀδικῶν ἅμα καὶ ἀγνωμονῶν ἦν δῆλος· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀποστὰς ὁ Πλάτων τοῦ ἔξω περιπάτου, ἔνδον ἐβάδιζε σὺν τοῖς ἑταίροις.

 

Aelian 4.9

“Plato used to call Aristotle Pôlos [the Foal]. What did he wish with that name? Everyone knows that a foal, when it has had its fill of baby’s milk, kicks its mother. Thus Plato was signaling a certain ingratitude on Aristotle’ part. Indeed, Aristotle received the greatest seeds of Philosophy from Plato and then, though he was filled to the brim with the best ideas, he broke with Plato rebelliously. He founded his own house, took his friends on Plato’s walk, and set himself up to be Plato’s rival.”

῾Ο Πλάτων τὸν ᾿Αριστοτέλη ἐκάλει Πῶλον. τί δὲ ἐβούλετο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα ἐκεῖνο; δηλονότι ὡμολόγηται τὸν πῶλον, ὅταν κορεσθῇ τοῦ μητρῴου γάλακτος, λακτίζειν τὴν μητέρα. ᾐνίττετο οὖν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἀχαριστίαν τινὰ τοῦ ᾿Αριστοτέλους. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος μέγιστα ἐς φιλοσοφίαν παρὰ Πλάτωνος λαβὼν σπέρματα καὶ ἐφόδια, εἶτα ὑποπλησθεὶς τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ ἀφηνιάσας, ἀντῳκοδόμησεν αὐτῷ διατριβὴν καὶ ἀντιπαρεξήγαγεν ἐν τῷ περιπάτῳ ἑταίρους ἔχων καὶ ὁμιλητάς, καὶ ἐγλίχετο ἀντίπαλος εἶναι Πλάτωνι.

Salutati Continues the Attack on Aristotelian Impostors

(Note: This is a follow-up to the previous post, Salutati Attacks Aristotelian Impostors )

(3.) It is a shame to see those men in their disputes, as they fabricate and propose a silly question in unintelligible and totally contrived terms. They cut up many things in a joking way, as though they meant to take them back up, and exercise themselves by responding to them in turn; they sprinkle around some propositions, they toss in some corollaries, and they heap up the conclusions.

(4.) And you can see them confirm their proofs of all of these things with various added (or perhaps I should say that they are winged, and flying) calculations. Aye indeed, it is a true shame to hear them in their disputes, when you perceive that because they lack any substance, they rely on their terms alone and seek nothing more than to bark as loud as the rest. But why should I talk about them as debaters? When they are in the mood to say nothing, or at any rate very little, about the question at hand, they instead contrive to capture their opponent in the snare of some idle sophistry.

(3.) Pudor est ipsos disputantes aspicere cum texentes quandam quodam modo cantilenam questionem verbis inintelligibilibus formatisque proponunt. Multa cavillosis sectionibus, in quarum alternatione respondendo versentur, quasi resumenda premittunt, propositiones spargunt, corollaria adiciunt, conclusiones accumulant.

(4.) Et horum omnium probationes allatis, ne dicam alatis et evolantibus, rationibus eos videas confirmare. Et vere pudor est ipsos disputantes audire, cum rebus inanes cernas solum inniti terminis et nichil magis appetere quam in equivoco delatrare. Quid de arguentibus loquar? Qui cum de questione nichil aut paucissima dicturi sint, alicuius sophysmatis laqueo nituntur capere disputantem.

Teachers Are Better than Parents: Some of Aristotle’s Sayings

A selection of Aristotle’s sayings from Diogenes Laertius’ biography (Vitae Philosophorum 5.21):

The following especially pleasant sayings have been attributed to Aristotle.

When asked what profit there is to lying, he said “Whenever we speak the truth, no one believes us”. After he was reproached for giving money to a wretched man, he said, “It wasn’t the character, but the man I pitied.”

He always used to say to his friends and his students whenever or wherever he was lecturing that “as sight takes the light from surrounding air, the soul draws on learning”. Often he used to remark that although the Athenians discovered wheat and laws, they used wheat but not their laws.

He said that the root of education is bitter but the fruit is sweet. When he was asked what grows old quickly, he said “thanks”. When asked what hope is, he said “It is dreaming while awake.” When Diogenes was trying to give him figs, he know that if he did not take them that Diogenes had prepared an insult. He took them and said that Diogenes had his insult but lost his figs. When he took them as they were offered a different time, he raised them up as if they were infants and said “Great is Diogenes” and he returned them.

He used to say that three things are needed for education: innate ability, study, and practice. After he heard that he was mocked by someone, he said, “Let him insult me when I am absent.”  He claimed that beauty was more effective than any letter of recommendation.  Others claim that this came from Diogenes and that he said that good looks are gifts from the gods. He said that Socrates was a short-lived tyrant, Plato was naturally superior, and Theophrastus was a silent lie. Theocritus he called an ivory-decked punishment and Carneadas a kingdom requiring no guard.

When asked what the difference was between those who were educated and those who were not, Aristotle said “as great as between the living and the dead.” He used to say that education was an ornament in good times and a refuge in bad. He also believed that teachers should be honored more than parents who merely gave birth. The latter give life, but the former help us live well. To a man boasting that he was from a great city, he said “Don’t look at this, but instead who is worthy of a great country.” When he was asked what a friend is, he replied “one soul occupying two bodies.”

He used to say that some people are sparing as if they will live forever while others spend as if they will die right away. To the man inquiring why we pursue beautiful things so much, he said. “This is a blind man’s question.” When asked what he had gained from philosophy, he said “doing unbidden what some do for fear of the law.”

When asked how students can advance, he said “if they pursue those in front of them and ignore those behind.” To the man talking endlessly when he assailed him with words and asked “Have a worn you out with nonsense”, he said “By Zeus, no! I wasn’t listening to you.” When someone blamed him for giving membership to a base man, he said, “I didn’t give it to a man, but to humanity.” When asked how we should act towards friends, he said “as we would pray they act towards us!” He defined justice as the virtue of a soul arranged in a worthwhile way. He used to say that education was the best provision for old age. In his Memorabilia, Favorinus records that he used to say “the man who has friends is no friend.”

Aristotle_Altemps_Inv8575

᾿Αναφέρεται δ’ εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἀποφθέγματα κάλλιστα ταυτί. ἐρωτηθεὶς τί περιγίνεται κέρδος τοῖς ψευδομένοις, “ὅταν,” ἔφη, “λέγωσιν ἀλήθειαν, μὴ πιστεύεσθαι.” ὀνειδιζόμενός ποτε ὅτι πονηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐλεημοσύνην ἔδωκεν, “οὐ τὸν τρόπον,” εἶπεν “ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἠλέησα.” συνεχὲς εἰώθει λέγειν πρός τε τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς φοιτῶντας αὐτῷ, ἔνθα ἂν καὶ ὅπου διατρίβων ἔτυχεν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ὅρασις ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος [ἀέρος] λαμβάνει  τὸ φῶς, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀπο-τεινόμενος τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἔφασκεν εὑρηκέναι πυροὺς καὶ νόμους· ἀλλὰ πυροῖς μὲν χρῆσθαι, νόμοις δὲ μή.

Τῆς παιδείας ἔφη τὰς μὲν ῥίζας εἶναι πικράς, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν γλυκύν. ἐρωτηθεὶς τί γηράσκει ταχύ, “χάρις,” ἔφη. ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστιν ἐλπίς, “ἐγρηγορότος,” εἶπεν, “ἐνύπνιον.” Διογένους ἰσχάδ’ αὐτῷ διδόντος νοήσας ὅτι, εἰ μὴ λάβοι, χρείαν εἴη μεμελετηκώς, λαβὼν ἔφη Διογένην μετὰ τῆς χρείας καὶ τὴν ἰσχάδα ἀπολωλεκέναι· πάλιν τε διδόντος λαβὼν καὶ μετεωρίσας ὡς τὰ παιδία εἰπών τε “μέγας Διογένης,” ἀπέδωκεν αὐτῷ. τριῶν ἔφη δεῖν παιδείᾳ, φύσεως, μαθήσεως, ἀσκήσεως. ἀκούσας ὑπό τινος λοιδορεῖσθαι, “ἀπόντα με,” ἔφη, “καὶ μαστιγούτω.” τὸ κάλλος παντὸς ἔλεγεν ἐπιστολίου συστατικώτερον. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν Διογένην φασὶν ὁρίσασθαι, αὐτὸν δὲ θεοῦ δῶρον εἰπεῖν εὐμορφίαν· Σωκράτην δὲ ὀλιγοχρόνιον τυραννίδα· Πλάτωνα προτέρημα φύσεως· Θεόφραστον σιωπῶσαν ἀπάτην· Θεόκριτον ἐλεφαντίνην ζημίαν· Καρνεάδην ἀδορυφόρητον βασιλείαν. ἐρωτηθεὶς τίνι διαφέρουσιν οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων, “ὅσῳ,” εἶπεν, “οἱ ζῶντες τῶν τεθνεώτων.” τὴν παιδείαν ἔλεγεν ἐν μὲν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις εἶναι κόσμον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καταφυγήν. τῶν γονέων τοὺς παιδεύσαντας ἐντιμοτέρους εἶναι τῶν μόνον γεννησάντων· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν παρασχέσθαι. πρὸς τὸν καυχώμενον ὡς ἀπὸ μεγάλης πόλεως εἴη, “οὐ τοῦτο,” ἔφη, “δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅστις μεγάλης πατρίδος ἄξιός ἐστιν.” ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι φίλος, ἔφη, “μία ψυχὴ δύο σώμασιν ἐνοικοῦσα.”

τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔλεγε τοὺς μὲν οὕτω φείδεσθαι ὡς ἀεὶ ζησομένους, τοὺς δὲ οὕτως ἀναλίσκειν ὡς αὐτίκα τεθνηξομένους. πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον διὰ τί τοῖς καλοῖς πολὺν χρόνον ὁμιλοῦμεν, “τυφλοῦ,”  ἔφη, “τὸ ἐρώτημα.” ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ποτ’ αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη, “τὸ ἀνεπιτάκτως ποιεῖν ἅ τινες διὰ τὸν ἀπὸτῶν νόμων φόβον ποιοῦσιν.” ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἂν προκόπτοιεν οἱ μαθηταί, ἔφη, “ἐὰν τοὺς προέχοντας διώκοντες τοὺς ὑστεροῦντας μὴ ἀναμένωσι.” πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα ἀδολέσχην, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ πολλὰ κατήντλησε, “μήτι σου κατεφλυάρησα;” “μὰ Δί’,” εἶπεν· “οὐ γάρ σοι προσεῖχον.” πρὸς τὸν αἰτιασάμενον ὡς εἴη μὴ ἀγαθῷ ἔρανον δεδωκώς—φέρεται γὰρ καὶ οὕτως—“οὐ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ,” φησίν, “ἔδωκα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ.” ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἂν τοῖς φίλοις προσφεροίμεθα, ἔφη, “ὡς ἂν εὐξαίμεθα αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν προσφέρεσθαι.” τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἔφη ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς διανεμητικὴν τοῦ κατ’ ἀξίαν. κάλλιστον ἐφόδιον τῷ γήρᾳ τὴν παιδείαν ἔλεγε. φησὶ δὲ Φαβωρῖνος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν ᾿Απομνημονευμάτων (FHG iii. 578) ὡς ἑκάστοτε λέγοι, “ᾧ φίλοι οὐδεὶς φίλος”·

Salutati Attacks Aristotelian Impostors

(1.) I do not think that it will be irrelevant, since all of our education is wrapped up with those things which the poets have sung about the deeds of Hercules, to preface by saying a bit about poesy. For I see that not only the vulgar mob, but even those who in our time boast that they are philosophers, will sometimes consider poetry of little value, and sometimes even condemn it entirely. Nor does the authority of their own teacher (since they consider themselves Aristotelians), whom they read – or, to speak more truly, whom they are capable of reading – move them to make use of the various poets not on fleeting occasions but at all times in the most refined studies.

(2.) But indeed, I do not wonder at them; rather, I am indgnant, and I grieve. For, although they typically brag that they fly about through the loftiest summits of logic (or, loyce, as they call it in their own corrupt way) and philosophy, and they are prepared to discourse on all subjects with disputatious loquacity, they neither understand the texts of Aristotle, nor do they even read them, but instead they seek out I know not what tracts from the “British, divided from the whole world[1]”, as if our own country were not sufficiently stocked with erudition. They seize upon these works during long lamp-lit nights and learn, without books and without the assistance of textual witnesses, dialectic, physics, and whatever else transcendental speculation can disclose; or perhaps I should say that they boast that they have learned something, now that the traditions of their master have been abandoned.

[1] Vergil, Eclouges 1.66: At nos hinc alii sitientis ibimus Afros,
pars Scythiam et rapidum cretae veniemus Oaxen               65
et penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos.

File:Aristotle. Woodcut by T. Stimmer (?), 1589. Wellcome V0000204EL.jpg

(1.) Non ab re futurum arbitror, cum omnis institutio nostra versetur circa ea que poete de rebus Herculis cecinerunt, aliquid de poetica prelibare. Hanc enim video non solum profanum vulgus sed etiam qui se philosophos nostro tempore gloriantur tum parvi pendere, tum damnare. Nec movet istos etiam sui magistri (cum se Aristotelicos profiteantur) autoritas, quem legunt, sive, ut verius loquar, legere possunt, non semel sed ubique varios poetas etiam in rebus subtilissimis allegare.

(2.) Verum ipsos non admiror, potius autem indignor et doleo. Nam cum per logices, imo (ut corrupto vocabulo dicunt) loyce, et philosophie cacumina volitare se iactent et de cunctis disputatione garrula discutere sint parati (proh pudor!), textus Aristotelicos nec intelligunt nec legunt sed nescio quos tractatus apud <<toto divisos orbe Britannos>>, quasi noster eruditioni non sufficiat situs, querunt. Quos totis lucubrationibus amplectentes sine libris et sine testium adminiculis et dialeticam et physicam et quicquid transcendens speculatio rimatur ediscunt, sive potius edidicisse relicitis sui magistri traditionibus gloriantur.